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This study investigates the role of market mechanisms on corporate governance through 
the interactions of corporate insiders (e.g., CEO and board of directors) and outside 
investors (e.g., short sellers and institutional investors) in information leakage, CEO 
human capital preference and product differentiation respectively.  
Firstly, prior studies generally argue that family insiders are better informed due to their 
long-standing knowledge and dominant control over the firm. Using a novel insider 
trading and short selling dataset from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), we 
investigate potential information leakage from corporate insiders to short sellers, 
particularly in family firms. Even without the presence of market makers in the HKEx, 
we document a significant increase in short selling volume before insider trades are 
released to the public. The non-monotonic relationship between the short selling 
intensity and family control contributes to the debate on whether family presence 
facilitates or limits information leakage. In addition, trading by non-family insiders is 
more likely to convey private information, as compared to family insiders.  
Secondly, a large body of literature has argued CEOs are the principal corporate 
decision makers and the most important corporate insiders. Drawing from the resource-
based view, we investigate whether CEO human capital is a source of competitive 
advantage for a firm and how institutional investors value it in the Chinese market. 
Using a manager-firm matched panel dataset of Chinese firms, we find that institutional 
investors tend to tilt their portfolios toward firms whose CEOs have more business ties 
and industry experience in the long run while their preference for political capital is 
more likely to be short-term focused. In particular, this preference heterogeneity for 
different types of CEO human capital is more pronounced for institutional investors 
II 
 
with shorter horizons. Compared to long-term investors, short-term investors are less 
likely to respond to sustainable competitive advantage brought by CEO business ties 
and industry experience. Furthermore, that their dynamic marginal holdings increase 
around CEO turnover as a result of political capital change confirms that these investors 
are likely to aim for short-term benefits from the firm. 
Thirdly, although the effect of institutional investors on firm performance is recognized 
in the literature, less well-studied is the role played by institutional investors in the 
governance of innovation process of publicly traded firms through inducing CEO 
efforts. We investigate how the presence of institutional investors can shape a firm’s 
industrial competitiveness through the governance of R&D and advertising expenditure. 
Our evidence suggests that institutional investors can promote product differentiation by 
monitoring the management. However, the role of institutional monitoring is only 
effective in the governance of advertising rather than R&D. Furthermore, after 
classifying institutional investors into active and passive ones, we find that it is mainly 
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1.1 Overview of Market Mechanisms  
Modern firms separate ownership from control of the firm’s assets. As a result, 
managers are the agents of shareholders, a relationship fraught with conflicting 
interests. Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the problem of managerial power and 
discretion has been analyzed as an “agency problem”. In order to align the interests of 
managers with shareholders, it is important to provide them with adequate incentives 
and discipline such as compensation contract, board of directors, laws and regulations, 
the market for corporate control, and even competitive market environment. Also, from 
Coase (1937), economists begin to define modern firms as isolated legal entities, who 
contract with other independent legal entities or individuals when they engage in 
exchange relationships both internally and externally. This contract relationship equally 
applies to the outside shareholders when firms seek for external finance. However, 
outside shareholders only contractually own the firm but are absent from managerial 
activities in the firm. This arises the possibility that insiders (e.g., managers and board 
of directors) of a firm are better informed about the future returns of projects than 
potential suppliers of finance outside the firm. The asymmetric information between 
managers and shareholders make the provision of external finance less viable. 
Thus, to protect the interests of shareholders, both regulators and shareholders must find 
ways to governance the information and incentive problems. This turns the discussion 
of modern finance to matters of information, incentives, and governance. Prior research 
has studied how conflicting of incentives can impede the maximization of shareholder 
value, and how governance mechanisms can minimize the agency and information 




and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999). To deal with 
these problems, investors need information and control, which can be achieved through 
market mechanisms. Effective market mechanisms incorporate two distinct features: 
investors’ ability to accurately assess the condition of the firm based on the access to the 
necessary information (market monitoring) and their ability to induce subsequent 
managerial actions to reflect the assessment (market influence) (Bliss and Flannery, 
2002).  
Over the last decades, many efforts have been made to better understand the role of 
market forces through market monitoring in corporate governance when shareholders 
fail to discipline managerial activities appropriately. The stock price of a firm is the 
most obvious and observable public signal by which the stakeholders can monitor the 
firm. When investors trade actively, their buying and selling decisions may move stock 
prices and thus the firm value. By doing market monitoring over the price and return 
based on the corporate information, investors in the financial market can simply buy 
(sell) their shares when a good (bad) managerial action is observed. For example, the 
short selling mechanism, as the market force, provides an additional and effective 
channel for investors to exit the firm prior to unfavorable public information, such as 
negative earnings surprises, analyst downgrades, and financial misconduct (e.g., 
Christophe et al., 2004, 2010). Thus, short selling mechanism has been traditionally 
recognized that it can contribute to market efficiency (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1987; Boehmer et al., 2008). Specifically, in certain circumstances, shareholders may 
not be able to respond and react soon enough with the power (e.g., voting rights) they 
have been granted and the availability of market forces like short selling increases the 




In addition to the market forces, shareholders can also choose to be more active in 
corporate governance by influencing management’s activities. However, both the 
incentive and the ability of individual investors to influence management’s activities are 
limited due to the atomistic or diffuse nature of their ownership. As the capital market 
changes, so does the market mechanism of corporate governance. An increasingly 
significant mechanism affecting corporate governance practice worldwide is the 
emergence of institutional investors as shareholders. For example, in the US, the 
aggregated institutional shareholding percentage grew from 6.10% in 1950 to 46.70% in 
2017. Globally, the aggregated institutional shareholding accounts for 22.50% of the 
total market value in 2017.1 As a result of block ownership, institutional investors have 
the potential to influence managerial actions directly (activism or voice) and indirectly 
by trading their shares (voting with their feet or exit) (Schwartz and Hirschman, 1972). 
Thus, the involvement of institutional investors in monitoring or control activities, as 
another market mechanism is effective in alleviating the agency problems (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2007). 
1.2 Motivations and Research Questions 
Previous research shows that different market mechanisms can help reduce agency cost 
through different governance structures (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999; Ferreira et al., 2009; Massa et al., 2015 ). The key 
feature to make these market mechanisms effective is the involvement of various 
stakeholders of the firm. Among various stakeholders, corporate insiders (e.g., CEO and 
board of directors) in the firm and institutional investors in the financial market are the 
most dominant ones according to their ownership over the firm. Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 
                                                             
1  See CEO, insider and institutional stock holdings as percent of total shares outstanding, 
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html    




present the summary statistics of CEO, insider and institutional ownership across the 
world, in the US and in China respectively by industries which are updated in January 
2017. In Table 1.1, we find that on average, the institutional ownership accounts for 
22.50% of total shares outstanding and insider ownership accounts for 20.83% of total 
shares outstanding worldwide, which together owns about half of the firm. In the US, 
institutional investors are more prevalent with a total 44.70% stock holdings according 
to Table 1.2. In emerging markets like China, institutional investors are also playing an 
increasingly important role with a total shareholding of 11.86%. The ownership of 
insiders are relatively similar in the US (15.10%) and in China (22.53%). CEO, as the 
most important insider, has a higher ownership in China (13.86%) compared to that in 
the US (5.69%).  
<Insert Table 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 about here> 
We aim to investigate how market mechanisms can help reduce agency problems and 
promote market efficiency through the interactions of different market participants like 
CEO, corporate insiders, short seller and institutional investors etc. The motivations for 
the next three chapters are listed as following: 
1.2.1 The interaction between insiders and short sellers through market forces 
Most research of corporate governance problems focuses on the failure to align 
managers’ interests with shareholders in widely held firms. This argument implicitly 
assumes that larger insider ownership can alleviate agency problem and lead to better 
corporate governance as the more the managers own, the less likely they are to take 
actions that harm the firm value. To take one step further, this assumption is trying to 
suggest that agency cost might be minimized in concentrated firms, such as family firms 




is not necessarily alleviated by the concentrated ownership. The potential conflicts of 
interest in family firms, can be complicated by factors such as culture-based family ties, 
shared family wealth, and nepotism (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Villalonga et al., 
2015).  
To identify the potential conflicts of interest between family insiders and non-family 
insiders, we examine the short sales around insider transactions in the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange (HKEx). Short sellers are often suspected of being informed traders as short 
interest negatively predicts stock returns (Boehmer et al., 2008; Karpoff and Lou, 2010; 
Engelberg et al., 2012). In addition, a large body of literature documents that short 
sellers have good timing skills, demonstrated by initiating short positions prior to 
unfavorable public announcements, such as negative earnings surprises, analyst 
downgrades, and financial misconduct (see, e.g., Christophe et al., 2004, 2010). Two 
recent studies (i.e., Khan and Lu, 2013; Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2013) explore the 
potential information interactions between short sellers and insiders, who are assumed 
to be the most informed group of a firm. While the above studies recognize short 
sellers’ informed trading, the channel through which they obtain their information 
advantage is unclear. To shed light on this, we examine whether short sellers become 
informed around insider transactions particularly family-controlled firms.   
1.2.2 The preference of institutional investors for CEOs 
Previous studies about the relationship between institutional investors and corporate 
governance focus on the relative role of institutional activism on CEO turnover (Parrino 
et al., 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Helwege et al., 2012). For example, Parrino et al. 
(2003) find that aggregate institutional ownership decrease by 12% on average in the 




institutional investors pay attention to the choice of CEO. The research so far on 
institutional investors’ preference mainly considers performance and governance factors 
of the firm (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011; 
McCahery et al., 2016). This is surprising given that a wide range of literature has 
emphasized the significant impact of manager-specific attributes and competencies on 
corporate decisions and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Hambrick, 2007; 
Cronqvist et al., 2012; Hu and Liu, 2015).  
Among all investors, we focus on institutional investors and examine whether they 
capture the value of CEO human capital in the Chinese stock market for several reasons. 
Firstly, similar to other investors, institutional investors have as strong preference for 
firms with good performance and governance, such as larger firm size, higher book-to-
market ratio and liquidity and greater board independence (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011; McCahey et al., 2016). However, 
financial balance sheets and corporate governance indicators are notoriously inadequate 
because they disregard intangible resources and people-based skills, probably the most 
strategically important resources to increase firm value (Grant, 1991). Because of the 
potential performance implications of CEO human capital, institutional owners consider 
these attributes when deciding whether to add new firms to their portfolios. Secondly, 
previous literature shows that institutional investors pay close attention to top 
management positions (Parrino et al., 2003; Helwege et al., 2012). Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) find that higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly 
performing CEOs. They could either “voting with their feet” by selling their own shares 
or play an active role in CEO turnover decision when dissatisfied with a firm’s 
management giving their large holding proportion over the firm. This indicates 




investors, institutional investors are more skilled with better access to market 
information and superior analysing ability (Gibson et al., 2004; Alti and Sulaeman, 
2012; Edelen et al., 2016). Thus, institutional investors’ sophistication enables them to 
be more sensitive to signals sent by top executives’ attributes. 
1.2.3 The influence of institutional investors on product innovation 
Institutional activism is by no means a new phenomenon, as institutions have become 
the majority owners in most large US corporations.  Institutional investors’ engagement 
in corporate governance can range from voice to exit, affecting various corporate 
decisions, including CEO turnover, compensation, and acquisitions (Hirschman, 1970; 
Parrino et al., 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; McCahery, 
2016). Yet we have little knowledge about whether institutional investors’ monitoring 
can help firms to improve their industrial competitiveness through vertical product 
differentiation, which increases consumers’ willingness to pay by creating unique 
products that appeal to consumers (Hotelling, 1929; Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Nevo, 
2000; Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012; Hoberg and Phillips, 2015).  
To improve product quality and enhance consumers’ willingness to pay, firms incur 
sunk costs, including R&D expenditures and advertising outlays (Sutton, 1991). 
However, such expenditures do not always lead to product diversification, as they may 
also reflect the agency conflicts of free cash flow and managerial entrenchment.  While 
many studies (e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 
1991; Motta, 1992; Ofek and Sarvary, 2003) has investigated the direct effect of R&D 
and advertising expenditures on a firm’s industrial position, the governance issues 
relating to such expenditures have received little attention in the prior literature. If 




hazard problems associated with incomplete contracts, monitoring by institutional 
investors can promote incentives to innovate by insulating managers against the 
consequences of bad income realizations. Therefore, in this study, we investigate the 
extent to which institutional investors affect the outcome product diversification 
through their effect on the governance of R&D and advertising expenses.   
Several studies show that R&D and advertising affect corporate outcomes, such as 
market value, systematic risk and the success of products (Shaked and Sutton, 1987; 
Sutton, 1991; Motta, 1992; Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Ofek and Sarvary, 2003; 
McAlister et al., 2007; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009). However, previous literature does 
not usually differentiate between the effects of R&D and advertising expenditures. In 
this study, we argue that R&D and advertising expenditures may have different impact 
on corporate outcomes for two important reasons. Firstly, R&D activities are inherently 
more difficult to monitor than advertising expenditures. This is because advertising is 
usually specifically targeted and its outcome can be predicted with a reasonable 
accuracy, whereas R&D outcomes are highly uncertain, difficult to define and measure.  
Secondly, managers are more able to periodically respond to institutional investors' 
concerns about advertising outlays than R&D expenditures. As it is relatively easy to 
periodically evaluate the progress of advertising, the monitoring activity of institutional 
investors can motivate managers to refocus and update their advertising plan or strategy 
throughout the advertising campaign. However, unless the product is successfully 
developed, it would be difficult to evaluate the periodic progress of R&D or make 




Our research focuses on the monitoring effect of institutional investors on the outcome 
of sunk costs (R&D and advertising), which is measured by ex-post product similarity 
2in the US market (Hoberg and Phillips, 2015). 
1.3 Contributions and Implications 
The agency problem associated with the separation of ownership and control in modern 
firms calls for effective corporate governance mechanisms, such as the board of 
directors, incentive-based contracts, monitoring provided by large shareholders or 
creditors and the legal and regulatory environment. The purpose of these mechanisms is 
to align the interests of managers with shareholders and thus maximize shareholder 
value. Previous research generally places more emphasis on the internal structural 
governance mechanisms (e.g., board of directors and CEO compensation).  
However, emphasizing the importance of the internal governance mechanism ignores 
the influence the external mechanisms such as market mechanisms. Also, the important 
institutional changes in capital markets lead to the correspondent changes in corporate 
governance practices. Instead of the dominance of individual investors, the outstanding 
emergence and growth of short sellers and institutional investors provides new evidence 
for the role of market mechanisms in affecting governance structures. Among all those 
mechanisms mentioned above, market mechanisms are playing an increasingly 
significant role, which include both the market forces like short selling mechanism and 
the activism of institutional investors. This study focuses on the interaction of different 
market participants through market mechanisms and examines how these interactions 
                                                             
2 Hoberg and Phillips (2015) develop a new algorithm to study how firms differ from their competitors 
using new time-varying measures of product similarity (Text-based Network Industry Classification, 
TNIC). This data is based on web-crawling and text parsing algorithms that process the text in the 










Information Leakage in Family Firms: Evidence from Short Selling 
and Insider Sales 
2.1 Introduction 
Information leakage, where material and non-public information is selectively revealed 
to a group of investors, is common in capital markets. This largely explains abnormal 
market reactions such as abnormal institutional trading, short selling and option trading 
ahead of earnings surprises, analyst recommendations, and other major corporate events 
(e.g., Christophe et al., 2004, 2010; Irvine et al., 2007; Hao, 2016). However, it is 
difficult to clearly identify the sources of information leakage in major capital markets 
such as the US, due to the involvement of both investors placing their trades and 
financial intermediaries executing the trades.  
Brokerages, as financial intermediaries handling the trades, are in a privileged position 
to access non-public trading information given their ability to observe both the size and 
directions of order flow before trade execution.4 Following trade execution, a delay is 
allowed before reporting the trade to the public, offering them a further opportunity to 
tip information. For instance, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
charged Merrill Lynch a $7 million penalty for its inadequate policies and procedures 
for controlling the access to institutional customer order flow. The confidential 
information in "squawk boxes," which are internal intercom systems used by broker-
dealers to broadcast institutional customer order information, was leaked to day traders 
                                                             
3 This chapter is published as Sun, H. and Yin, S., 2017. Information leakage in family firms: Evidence 
from short selling around insider sales. Journal of Corporate Finance, 47, pp.72-87. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.005 
4 According to the SEC, trade execution is not instantaneous. SEC regulations do not require a trade to be 




in other firms who then traded ahead of the orders placed by Merrill Lynch’s customers 
(SEC, 2009).  
Corporate insiders are another source of private information leakage given their in-
depth knowledge of the firm. Market regulators are trying to limit insiders’ scope to 
leak non-public and material information. For example, the SEC has run a series of 
campaigns against the rise of so-called “expert networks”5, in which corporate insiders 
are hired as expert consultants from $300 to $1,000 an hour to speak confidentially to 
hedge fund managers. That expertise, however, can sometimes cross the line into 
material and non-public information (e.g., Zuckerman and Pulliam, 2010; Thompson, 
2013).   
Given the difficulties in isolating these two potential channels, and given that the 
literature mainly points to the leakage from financial intermediaries (e.g., Khan and Lu, 
2013; Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2013; McNally et al., 2017), it is worthwhile seeking 
an unique setting in which only one channel (corporate insiders) exists. This specific 
channel needs to be better understood. Thus, in this paper, we investigate whether 
information leakage still exists in a market without the presence of financial 
intermediaries to identify the leakage from corporate insiders, particularly insiders from 
family firms.6  Our study offers insight into the internal governance of corporate 
insiders, especially for family firms where external discipline is difficult to implement.  
We base our study on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx). Unlike the US stock 
market, which is facilitated by dealers/market makers, the HKEx is a pure order-driven 
                                                             
5 The experts can be company executives, directors and professionals (e.g., doctors, engineers and 
technology experts).  
6 Family firms dominate economic activities around the world, controlling about one-third of the S&P 500 
firms in the US and over two-thirds of the firms in East Asia and Europe (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Claessens et al., 2000;  Faccio and Lang, 2002; Anderson et al., 2003, 2009, 2012). Also, prior literature 
illustrates that family insiders are well informed, as a result of their dominant control over the firm (e.g., 




system, standing out as an ideal representative for trading mechanisms without market 
makers. In addition, the HKEx is a global financial hub with sophisticated investors, 
such as short sellers. The presence and engagement of short sellers can facilitate our 
identification of abnormal market reactions as they are more likely to be better informed 
than average investors (e.g., Boehmer et al., 2008; Christophe et al., 2004, 2010; 
Karpoff and Lou, 2010; Engelberg et al., 2012). Furthermore, a significant number of 
Hong Kong firms are family owned and controlled (Claessens et al., 2000; Jaggi et al., 
2009). The 10 most prominent families in Hong Kong control around 32.1% of all 
corporate assets (Tsui and Stott, 2004) and approximately half of Hong Kong’s firms 
are family controlled (Jaggi et al., 2009).   
Specifically, we study potential information leakage from corporate insiders to short 
sellers by examining abnormal short sales around insider transactions. Our results 
suggest that short sellers initiate their short positions before insider sales are publicly 
reported (i.e., ahead of average investors), indicating the potential for information 
leakage. Interestingly, in family controlled firms, the intensity of short selling exhibits a 
non-monotonic function of family control rights: it increases with family control in 
general, but weakens for firms with higher levels of family control. After distinguishing 
insider sales placed by family members from those placed by non-family insiders, we 
find that transactions by non-family insiders trigger larger abnormal short sales than 
those by family insiders. Furthermore, following Cohen et al. (2012), we conduct a sub-
sample analysis by distinguishing between routine and opportunistic insider trades, as 
opportunistic ones are more likely to result from private information. We find greater 
abnormal short selling volume for opportunistic trades for weakly controlled family 




Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we study information 
leakage under a trading system that is fundamentally different from that the ones 
prevailing in the US. Trading systems with financial intermediaries acting as market 
markers assure liquidity and facilitate price discovery, yet pay a price of lower 
transparency compared to a pure order-driven system (e.g., Madhavan, 1992; Pagano 
and Röell, 1996; Malinova and Park, 2013). Recent studies in the US (e.g., Khan and 
Lu, 2013; Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2013; McNally et al., 2017) show that short sellers 
can obtain private price-relevant information from brokerages who execute insider 
sales. This indicates that the involvement of market makers could undermine market 
fairness through leaking private information, resulting in wealth transfers among 
investors.  
Second, our study suggests that the insider channel for information leakage should not 
be neglected. Although Anderson et al. (2012) highlight that corporate insiders in 
family firms can be motivated to engage in informed trading, which helps explain the 
abnormal short sales around negative earnings surprises, they are not able to present 
direct evidence as their dataset does not flag insider trades. Our data allows us to 
identify each corporate insider through monitoring their trades. We, thus, provide direct 
evidence that private information leakage can originate from the investors making the 
trading (i.e., corporate insiders). Understanding this channel emphasizes the need to 
focus on the underlying governance of a firm, rather than simply building a Chinese 
Wall such as the Regulation Fair Disclosure when regulating insider trading. 
Finally, prior literature on informed trading in family firms (e.g., Chan et al., 2010; 
Anderson et al., 2012) focuses mainly on the contrast between family and non-family 
firms. It overlooks the sharp heterogeneity in that family ownership and control vary 




involvement in Hong Kong provide us with a rare opportunity.7  Given these features, 
we explore whether the desire of a controlling family to limit information leakage can 
be moderated by its relative control over the firm and document a non-monotonic 
relationship between family control and the intensity of information leakage. 
Furthermore, the literature on potential conflicts between the controlling family and 
non-family employees (e.g., e.g., Perez-Gonzalez, 2006; Bennedsen et al., 2007; 
Bertrand et al., 2008) calls for compelling empirical evidence. Our data enables us to 
locate each insider’s identity. This helps us examine whether the affiliation to the family 
influences their likelihood of leaking information, thus explicitly manifesting the 
potential conflicts of interest.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents literature and 
hypothesis development. Section 2.3 explains the institutional background. Section 2.4 
describes the data sources and descriptive statistics. Section 2.5 presents the research 
methodology. Section 2.6 discusses the empirical results and robustness checks. Section 
2.7 concludes the paper. 
2.2 Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Prior studies generally argue that family insiders are better informed due to their long-
standing knowledge and dominant control over the firm (e.g., Demsetz, 1986; Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Anderson et al., 2009; Chan et al., 
2010). With easy access to privileged information, they can exploit this potential 
advantage for private benefits by engaging in informed trading either by themselves or 
by tipping information to outside investors. Even in the presence of strict insider trading 
                                                             
7 According to summary statistics, family voting rights vary from 30% to 80%, and family board seats 




regulations,8 heavily monitored and scrutinized family insiders can still leak information 
to their relatives or friends, who bear less attention from the public.  
On the other hand, the controlling family also has incentives to limit informed trading. 
First, as long-term investors, they are less likely to trade for short-term benefits. 
Founding family often see themselves as stewards of the family business for future 
generations and their control often spans multiple decades, sometimes even centuries 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2006). For example, the founding family members in S&P 500 
firms have on average held their positions for more than 78 years, and have typically 
invested more than 69% of their personal wealth in the firm (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
The long investment horizon and their undiversified holdings bind them to focus on the 
firm’s long-term growth rather than the short-term profits from trading on private 
information (Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Hillier et al., 2015). Second, family affiliation 
and the ties of both the founders and heirs motivate them to be especially concerned 
about the reputation and commitment to the firm. Therefore, they are less likely to 
engage in information-based transactions or information leakage to outside investors, 
which could harm their economic benefits and reputation.  
In our study, we focus on family firms and explore whether family control and 
affiliation to the family can influence corporate insiders’ potential to engage in 
information leakage. 
2.2.1 Family control and potential information leakage 
The desire of a controlling family to limit information leakage can be moderated by its 
controlling power over the firm. As Fan and Wong (2002, p. 406) argue, “[o]nce the 
controlling owner obtains effective control of the firm, any increase in voting rights 
                                                             
8 Some firms have their own insider trading policy and code of practice going beyond regulations 




does not further entrench the controlling owner, but his/her higher cash flow rights in 
the firm mean that it will cost more to divert the firm’s cash flows for private gain.” In 
firms with concentrated family dominance, benefits extracted from informed trading are 
relatively small, as compared to the overall stock discount losses caused by negative 
signals to the market. The concentrated family ownership and control provides a 
guarantee that they are willing to build a reputation for not expropriating outside 
investors (Gomes, 2000). Strong control also makes the controlling family more capable 
of limiting information leakage. The relatively small group of controlling family 
shareholders, resulting from concentrated family control, largely eliminates the 
opportunity for outside investors to engage in informed trading (Anderson et al., 2009). 
Thus, we hypothesize that the stronger the family control, the more likely the family 
will protect the firm against information leakage and informed trading. 
2.2.2 Family affiliation and potential information leakage  
The conflicts of interest between family insiders and non-family insiders in family firms 
can also trigger information leakage. The family’s objective function often includes a 
wide range of goals such as “preserving the family’s legacy and reputation, 
implementing the family’s values, mission and vision, and protecting the family name, 
maintaining family unity and harmony…” (Villalonga et al., 2015, pp.645). Hence, the 
family management is perhaps not value-maximizing, but rather utility-maximizing for 
the founding family (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). For example, family founders may 
derive utility by hiring top management from their kinship network, rather than 
outsiders via a competitive process. Furthermore, hiring family members may also 
damage the relationships between family and non-family employees, leading to 
resentment from non-family employees (Schulze et al., 2001; Bennedsen et al., 2007; 




controlling family, to maximize their own wealth, non-family directors and managers 
are less likely to share all of the objectives with the controlling family. Thus, non-family 
insiders may impose their self-serving desires through information leakage. For the 
reasons discussed, we hypothesize that non-family insiders in family firms are more 
likely to leak private information compared to family insiders. 
2.3 Institutional Background 
2.3.1 The stock market mechanism in Hong Kong 
In the US stock market, the center of transaction execution is the market maker who 
quotes two-way prices (i.e., bid and ask). Customers, who may be investors or other 
intermediaries, place their orders with the market maker, who will adjust his/her prices 
depending on the state of his/her book. In contrast, the execution center in an order-
driven market is the exchange in which intermediaries have no role in the transaction 
execution process. Investors’ orders are routed to a central order book and executed 
against one another. The electronic system in Hong Kong, known as the Automatic 
Order Matching and Execution System (AMS), matches appropriate bid and ask orders 
automatically.  
An order-driven system is more transparent in terms of both trade matching and 
information disclosure. In the US, while trade execution is usually seamless, it could 
take time. Since the SEC does not require a trade to be executed within a set period of 
time, it provides financial intermediaries an opportunity to tip impending trading 
information to a third party prior to trade execution. After a trade is executed, in order to 
protect their positions, market makers are allowed a delay in reporting the executed 
trade to the public, which offers a further chance to tip trading information. In contrast, 




to the public in real time (e.g., the current best five bid and ask prices and the number of 
shares available). Trades executed in the HKEx are released to the market as soon as 
they are matched and are then available to all investors who subscribe to trading 
information simultaneously. 
2.3.2 Insider trading and short selling in Hong Kong 
Part XV of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO) launched by the Securities and 
Futures Commission (SFC) in Hong Kong refers to the disclosure of interests, requiring 
substantial shareholders (5% or more of voting shares), directors, and chief executives 
of a listed firm to disclose all their interests in the listed corporation or any associated 
companies. Under the framework of the SFO, any substantial shareholder, director, 
chief executive, or employee of a listed company or its associated companies can be an 
insider of the listed firm. The board of directors and top management, regardless of their 
shareholding percentage, must notify the SFC by filing Form 3A within three business 
days of any change in the nature of their interests, which is the original source for 
insiders’ trading information.  
In January 1994, the HKEx launched a pilot scheme for regulated short selling under 
which 17 securities became eligible for short selling. Up to date, not all stocks on the 
HKEx can be short sold. Based mainly on liquidity and market value criteria, the HKEx 
updates the list of securities eligible for short selling on a quarterly basis. As of 
November 14, 2014, the end of our sample period, 755 stocks on the Main Board were 
eligible for short selling. 
2.3.3 Family firms in Hong Kong 
Whereas ownership of many public firms in Western countries such as the US and UK 




ownership and control. To safeguard family interests, they also routinely appoint family 
members to sit on the board (Jaggi et al., 2009; Leung et al., 2012). It is reported that 
families control approximately half of Hong Kong’s firms through pyramid structures, 
disproportionate board representation, and historical ties to the firm (Jaggi et al., 2009). 
According to the Director’s Handbook issued by the HKEx in April 2017, 9  a 
“controller” means any director, chief executive, or controlling shareholder who can 
exercise or control the exercise of 30% or more of the voting power at general meetings. 
Accordingly, we take a threshold of 30% or more of the voting rights across all family 
members to define family-controlled firms.10  Further, a “majority-controlled company” 
refers to a company held by any person who can exercise or control the exercise of more 
than 50% of the voting power at general meetings, or control the composition of a 
majority of the board of directors. We, thus, define a strongly controlled family firm if 
family voting rights exceed 50%, and otherwise as a weakly controlled family firm.  
The HKEx also serves as the primary location for Chinese mainland firms seeking 
foreign financing. By the end of 2014, there were about 300 firms listed in Hong Kong 
that were controlled by the Chinese government, accounting for one fifth of all publicly 
listed firms on the Main Board11 of the HKEx. 12 Thus, in addition to family firms and 
widely held firms, we also include H shares and red chips as state-controlled firms. 
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
                                                             
9 See Director’s Handbook,  “http://www.hkexgroup.com/-/media/HKEX-Group-Site/ssd/Corporate-
Governance/Documents/Handbook_website.pdf” 
10 We conduct robustness checks for different thresholds of family voting rights from 20% to 35%. The 
results are largely consistent and available upon request. 
11 The Main Board and the Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) comprise the HKEx securities market. They 
provide a marketplace for capital formation by different types of companies. Main Board companies are 
generally larger and have a longer history and profit record. Those without a profit record must satisfy 
alternative financial tests. See https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/global/faq/hkex%20markets.htm 
12 The number of H shares and red chips is sourced from the China Stock Market and Accounting 




2.4.1 Data sources and sample selection 
On one hand, short sellers are considered particularly well-informed and sophisticated 
investors in anticipating adverse corporate announcement. On the other hand, there is an 
extensive literature on insider trading. One related stream is the literature on return 
predictability of insider sales. The evidence in Seyhun (1986, 1998) and Jagolinzer 
(2009), and Cohen et al. (2012) suggests that insider sales predict negative abnormal 
returns. In contrast, insider purchases are more likely to convey favorable corporate 
information, which we expect their lack of leakage and/or influence on short selling. 
Thus, although insiders can execute both purchases and sales, only insider sales are 
selected as short sellers are more sensitive to negative corporate events. 
Also, this study is facilitated by newly available high-frequency short sales data and the 
intraday transaction data. In contrast, the prior literature has generally used monthly 
short interest data (total short interest at one point in time, not transaction data for the 
month), or in very few instances has used proprietary transaction data. By combining 
daily short selling with daily insider sales data, I am able to take advantage of the higher 
frequency data to conduct an event study of short sales around insider sales. Examining 
the lead-lag relation between the trades of the two groups is thus a powerful setting to 
study whether short sellers’ information is from public or non-public sources. 
We examine short selling around insider transactions on the HKEx from January 2009 
to December 2014. The insider transactions for all open market sales are downloaded 
from Thomson One, which provides trading by the chairman, chief executives, other 




executive directors.13 Each transaction records the firm’s name, the firm’s stock code, 
the name of the insider who executed the trade, the insider’s position in the firm, the 
transaction date, the number of shares traded, the transaction price, the transaction value, 
and the insider’s shareholding after the transaction. The dataset selection procedure is 
summarized in Table 2.1.  
The original sample contains 7,921 transactions covering 726 firms. Some insiders 
execute multiple transactions in a single day. These multiple transactions executed by 
the same person on the same day are consolidated and recorded as one transaction. To 
control for the compounding effects of earnings and dividend announcements, insider 
sales within 20 days of these events are eliminated (Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2013). 
The data for earnings and dividend announcements are collected from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). As each insider can also have 
multiple transaction records on different dates over the study period, only the first 
transaction within any 30 consecutive days is taken as one event. Since not all Hong 
Kong stocks are eligible for short selling, it further reduces the number of observations 
to 1,341 transactions for 320 firms. 14  Financial firms such as banks, insurance 
companies, investment funds, and real estate companies are also excluded.15 Finally, we 
obtain a dataset of 1,148 observations for 254 firms.  
<Insert Table 2.1 about here> 
The daily short selling volume is obtained from the HKEx. The stock market and 
                                                             
13 When analyzing insider trading, we define both directors and top management as insiders in our main 
analysis. In a further robustness check, we exclude managers who are not on the board, and the results 
remain unchanged. 
14 A dynamic short selling list is manually identified using the short selling announcements on the HKEx 
website. The HKEx website posts only the latest list of securities that are eligible for short selling, but 
announcements for every previous change to the short selling list can be found. Thus, the short selling list 
posted on March 24, 2015, is taken as the benchmark short selling list and every dynamic short selling list 
between two adjustments is back deducted.  
15 A sample with all firms, including financial firms, is analyzed as a robustness check, and the results 




accounting data are from Bloomberg. To measure the controlling power in listed firms, 
we manually collect insiders’ biographies and shareholding information from annual 
reports. This allows identification of family members on the board and their respective 
shareholding interests. In Hong Kong, directors’ interests are disclosed under four 
categories: personal interests, family interests, corporate interests, and other interests. 
Personal interests document beneficial interests directly registered in the name of the 
director. Family interests identify shares held by a director’s spouse or children under 
the age of 18. Corporate interests record those interests that a director is deemed to have, 
with respect to any corporation in which he or she is entitled to either exercise or control 
the exercising of one-third or more of the voting power in general meetings, or where 
the corporation or its directors are accustomed to acting in accordance with his or her 
directions or instructions. Other interests normally refer to interests in the form of 
options, beneficiaries, or trustees. These four categories are aggregated across all 
members of the controlling family to form the total voting rights of the family.  
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for directors’ trades, large controlling shareholders, 
and family control characteristics. Panel A reports the summary statistics for transaction 
size by category of directors. Other senior executives include chief financial officers, 
chief operating officers, chief investment officers, and managers. The overall 
transaction size for Hong Kong directors, 0.509% as the number of shares outstanding, 
is comparable to the 0.58% for US directors (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001), but smaller 
than the 1.38% for UK directors (Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Unlike the US market in which 
management accounts for most of directors’ sales, chief executives in Hong Kong have 




Panel B records summary statistics for the controlling power of large controlling 
shareholders measured at the end of 2012.16 For the 141 family-controlled firms (55.5% 
of all firms), controlling power refers to the voting rights of all family members; for the 
41 state-controlled firms (16.1% of all firms), the controlling power of large controlling 
shareholders refers to the voting rights of the state; for the 72 non-controlled firms 
(28.3% of all firms), it refers to the voting rights of the largest substantial shareholder. 
According to Panel B, both the family and the state control, on average, over 50% of the 
voting rights, with the highest approaching 80%. Even for non-controlled firms, the 
largest shareholder has a relatively high stake of 20% compared to the UK (5%) and US 
(10%) markets, respectively (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Finally, 
Panel C shows summary statistics of family control. It shows that family firms have 
1.766 family members sitting on their board on average, accounting for 20% of the 
board.  
<Insert Table 2.2 about here> 
Table 2.3 presents the summary statistics for insider sale event and firm characteristics. 
In Panel A, the number of insider sales per firm has a mean of 4.52, which indicates that 
the sample firms have four insider sales on average over the study period. The short 
selling volume per day measures the daily short selling activity for each firm. The daily 
short selling volume accounts for an average of 0.022% of total shares outstanding. The 
average daily short selling volume in the [-30, -11] window measures short selling 
activity from 30 to 11 days before the insider sale event. The event day short selling 
volume (0.024%) is larger than the average short selling volume (0.018%). This 
                                                             
16 Generally, block shareholders do not change substantially across several years. Therefore, we take the 




provides preliminary evidence that short sellers are more active on the day of insider 
sales.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 reports summary statistics and correlation matrix for firm 
characteristics. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market value. Book to 
market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of 
equity. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask 
spread is measured as the daily bid price minus the daily ask price, divided by the 
average of the daily bid and ask prices.  represents the cumulative daily 
short selling volume five days prior to the insider sale date as a percentage of firm’s 
shares outstanding.  measures the cumulative daily abnormal size-adjusted 
returns during the five days prior to the insider sale date.  is denoted as the size-
adjusted abnormal returns on the insider sale date. For size-adjusted returns, we first 
sort all stocks into deciles based on daily market capitalization, and then calculate the 
equally weighted average returns for each portfolio on a daily basis as the benchmark 
returns. The size-adjusted abnormal return for event  on day  is its daily return on day 
 minus the return on the portfolio to which it belongs. 
According to the correlation matrix, larger firms show higher turnover and lower bid-
ask spread, indicating better liquidity. However, the size of firm does not correlate with 
short selling volume and cumulative abnormal return before insider sales. In addition, 
the negative correlation between  and presents consistent evidence 
that short interest negatively predicts stock returns (Boehmer et al., 2008; Karpoff and 
Lou, 2010; Engelberg et al., 2012). 





2.5.1 Daily abnormal short sales 
To investigate the intensity of short sales around insider transactions, we employ an 
event-study approach to measure the abnormal short selling volume around each insider 
sale. The date of the insider sale is taken as the event day. The event window [-10, +10] 
is the period from 10 trading days before to 10 days after the event date (day 0). We use 
an estimation window of [-30, -11], which runs from 30 to 11 days prior to the event, to 
estimate the expected daily short selling volume for each event.17 The short selling 
volume for firm  and insider sale event  on day  is denoted by . The expected 
daily short selling volume is estimated as the mean of daily short selling volume 
from day -30 to day -11, which is  
                                                  (1) 
The daily abnormal short selling volume within the event window is 
                                 (2) 
Denoting the number of shares outstanding by , the abnormal short selling 
volume for each day in the event window is 
                                   (3)  
2.5.2 Cumulative abnormal short sales  
                                                             
17 According to Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2013), estimation window [-60, -11] may allow the inclusion of 
compounding events in addition to insider sales. Thus, we report the results when the estimation window 
is set as [-30,-11] in the paper. However, in unreported results, we also conduct analysis based on an 




According to Hong Kong regulations, insiders are required to disclose their trades to the 
public within three business days following the transaction by filing Form 3A. Based on 
this, we construct cumulative abnormal short sales across different windows within 
three business days including [0, 1], [0, 2], [0, 3], [1, 2], and [1, 3] to test whether short 
sellers are informed. Following previous literature (i.e., Khan and Lu, 2013; 
Chakrabarty and Shkilko, 2013), we expect that the filing date is when average 
investors first become aware of the insider trade. Despite short sellers’ ability to analyze 
visible order flow, the insider status and trading interest are not immediately observable 
until the transaction is disclosed. Thus, we argue that if short sellers continuously react 
to insiders’ transactions within three business days in addition to day zero, it indicates 
that their trading is informed.  
2.5.3 Determinants of abnormal short sales 
Prior research shows that both insider trading and short selling intensity can be affected 
by a series of return-related and liquidity-related variables. Diether et al. (2009) show 
that short sellers begin to increase their positions once lasting positive returns are 
obtained. Similarly, insiders are also likely to trade following positive returns 
(Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Khan and Lu, 2013). Thus, it is important to control for 
both lagged returns and current returns as determinants of short selling activity. To 
investigate the determinants of abnormal short sales, we run a multiple regression model 
as follows: 
               (4) 
In Equation (4),  indicates firm ;  indicates event , which is an executed insider 




dependent variable is daily abnormal short sales.  is an indicator 
variable which captures short sellers’ trading intensity within the three-day disclosure 
window. We use  , , and  for event day 0, event 
window [0, 1] and [0, 2], respectively.  equals one when the day is day 0, and 
zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0 or day 1, and zero 
otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0, day 1, or day 2, and zero 
otherwise.  
Following prior literature, we use a set of variables to control for other potential 
determinants of abnormal short sales, including Firm size, Turnover, Bid-ask spread, 
book-to-market, , , and . The heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors are used to estimate the coefficients. The standard errors are 
clustered at the event level. Industry and year effects are also controlled for multiple 
regressions. 
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Univariate analysis for abnormal short sales  
Panel A of Table 2.4 reports the daily abnormal short sales in the [-10, +10] event 
window for all firms, family-controlled firms, non-controlled firms, and state-controlled 
firms.18  For all firms, the abnormal short selling volume accounts for 0.0041%, 
0.0083%, and 0.0060% of shares outstanding on day -1, day 0, and day 1, respectively. 
Unlike Khan and Lu (2013), who find that short sellers can initiate their short positions 
as many as seven days prior to insiders’ sales, the front-running phenomenon of short 
                                                             
18 Two or more directors with different titles in the same firm can execute their trades on the same day. 
We take this day only once as an insider event when implementing the event study. This further reduces 
the insider sales observations to 946 compared to the 1,148 in Table 1. In Table 10, for robustness check, 




sellers is not found in our study. Khan and Lu (2013) suspect that the leakage occurs 
when information about the upcoming trading is intercepted during the course of trade 
execution. In Hong Kong, without the presence of market makers, the front-running 
phenomenon no longer exists. The abnormal short sales on the event day can be 
attributed to short sellers’ ability to analyze visible order flow. Insider sales are often 
large, and thus create significant disturbances in the supply of shares. Such disturbances 
are detected by sophisticated tape monitors, who subsequently sell short (Chakrabarty 
and Shkilko, 2013). On the HKEx, the electronic screen displays order and trade 
information to the public on a real-time basis. Trades executed are released to the 
market as soon as they are matched. Thus, it is easier for short sellers to monitor the 
order flow compared to a quote-driven market.  
Panel B reports the cumulative abnormal short sales. We document significantly 
positive abnormal short sales across [0, 1], [0, 2], and [0, 3] event windows (0.0110%, 
0.0141%, and 0.0142% of shares outstanding, respectively) for family-controlled firms, 
but not for non-controlled and state-controlled firms. Even after excluding day 0, 
family-controlled firms still exhibit significantly cumulative abnormal short sales 
(0.0076%) in the [1, 2] event window.19 Our initial evidence on abnormal short sales 
shows potential information leakage as short position opened before the public 
announcement of an insider sale and closed upon market reaction to the announcement.  
<Insert Table 2.4 about here> 
2.6.2 Abnormal short sales and potential information leakage  
                                                             
19 As all transactions should be released to the public by day 3, we do not find the cumulative abnormal 





Table 2.5 reports the regression results concerning abnormal short sales around insider 
transactions. Based on variable definition, ,  and  
record the intensity of abnormal short sales before average investors become aware of 
insider trading. If information leakage regarding insider sales exists, we expect to 
observe positive abnormal short sales within three business days. Model (1) shows that 
the event effect on short selling activity is significantly positive. For family-controlled 
firms, we find a statistically significant insider sale effect on short selling in Models (4), 
(5), and (6). While for non-controlled and state-controlled firms, we observe either a 
weak relationship or no relationship at all between the insider sale event and abnormal 
short selling.  
For the control variables, our results suggest that short selling activity is more intense in 
firms with higher turnover and a heavier historical short position. Also, short sellers 
favor initiating short selling after positive cumulative abnormal returns, which is 
consistent with Khan and Lu (2013) and Chakrabarty and Shkilko (2013).    
<Insert Table 2.5 about here> 
2.6.3 Abnormal short sales and family control 
In this sub-section, we explore how family control influences the potential information 
leakage from corporate insiders. Family voting rights and family board members are 
used to measure family control.20 Table 2.6 shows that short selling intensity has a non-
monotonic relationship with family control. Based on the magnitude and significance of 
the coefficients on ,  and , the intensity of abnormal 
                                                             
20 In unreported results, we also take family board presence as a proxy for family control, and the results 
are qualitatively the same. Family board presence is the number of family members sitting on the board as 
a percentage of the total number of board members. The threshold of family board presence to define a 




short sales is stronger in firms with weak family control (family voting rights <50% and 
family board seats <221), in Models (1), (2), (3) and (7), (8), (9) than in firms with 
strong family control in Models (4), (5), (6) and (10), (11), (12).  
The difference in short selling intensity due to relative controlling power supports that 
corporate insiders in strongly controlled family firms are less likely to leak private 
information compared to weakly controlled family firms. This is because, holding an 
undiversified portfolio, family shareholders with strong control may have a longer 
investment horizon and more reputational concerns for the firm. Also, given strong 
control, the controlling family are more capable of limiting information leakage. 
<Insert Table 2.6 about here> 
2.6.4 Abnormal short sales and non-family insiders 
Among family-controlled firms, we further explore whether the likelihood of leaking 
information depend on insider’s affiliation with the family. Insider sales are classified 
into two groups. One group includes trades executed by family insiders, while the other 
refers to trades executed by insiders who do not belong to the family. Models (1), (2), 
and (3) in Table 7 shows that abnormal short sales increase significantly for event day 0, 
event windows [0, 1], and [0, 2], following trades executed by non-family insiders, 
while no significant impact is observed for transactions executed by family insiders.  
The results confirm the conjecture about potential conflicts of interest between family 
insiders and non-family insiders. Overall, insiders who are not related to the family can 
be a source of information leakage due to the desire to pursue personal interest. Thus, 
                                                             
21 According to the summary statistics in Table 2, average family voting rights is 51.186% and average 
family board seats is 1.766. Thus, we take a threshold of 50% for family voting rights and 2 for family 
board seats. Our criteria are also consistent with the definition for a majority-controlled company by the 





family affiliation can have a significant effect on corporate insiders’ potential to leak 
information. 
<Insert Table 2.7 about here> 
2.6.5 Insider sales and abnormal returns 
To assess the stock return predictability of insider trading, we calculate abnormal stock 
returns following insider sales. Table 2.8 reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for various event windows around insider sales.22 CARs are significantly positive at the 
1% level in windows [-5, -1] and [-10, -1] for all firms. This suggests that insiders 
prefer to sell their shares after a short term of positive abnormal returns.  
In Panel A, we do not document significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns for 
family-controlled firms in the [0, +10] event window. Among family firms, in Panel B, 
firms with weak family control (family voting rights <50%, family board seats <2, and 
family board presence <20%) display significantly negative cumulative abnormal 
returns in the [0, +10] event window, compared to firms with strong family control (-
0.0131%, -0.0154% and -0.0115% respectively). 23This provides further evidence that 
short sellers initiate larger short positions around insider sales in firms with relatively 
weaker family control because it is more profitable. Similarly, in Panel C, we document 
larger significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns for transactions executed by 
insiders who are not affiliated to the family. This suggests that transactions by non-
                                                             
22 The abnormal returns defined by the market model are also tested. The results remain qualitatively the 
same. 
23 According to the trading regulation disclosed by the HKEx, 0.005% of the amount of the consideration 
for each transaction of securities admitted to trading, listed, or approved to be listed on Exchange. 
Compared with the economic significance of CARs ((-0.0131%, -0.0154% and -0.0115% respectively), 





family directors and managers are more profitable. Overall, informed trading by short 
sellers is more active following insider transactions with higher abnormal returns. 
<Insert Table 2.8 about here> 
2.6.6 Robustness tests 
2.6.6.1 Opportunistic and routine insider trades 
Cohen et al. (2012) develop a new algorithm to decode the information content of 
insider trading. For each insider, they analyze his/her past trading history and search for 
consistent patterns through the timing of their trades. Based on their algorithm, insider 
trades can be classified as opportunistic and routine ones. They suggest that 
opportunistic insider transactions are more likely to be driven by private information, 
while routine transactions are more likely to be driven by diversification or liquidity 
reasons. Following Cohen et al. (2012), we identify the transactions made by an insider 
who places a trade in the same calendar month for at least two consecutive years, or the 
trading time interval between two consecutive trades is fixed as routine trades, and the 
rest as opportunistic trades.24 Because the information content of opportunistic insider 
trades is high, the potential of information leakage around those transactions is also 
expected to be high.  
Table 2.9 shows the regression results for routine insider trades and opportunistic 
insider trades.25 _r, _r, and _r capture the insider sale 
effect on short selling intensity for routine transactions, while _o, 
                                                             
24 We expand the range of routine trades based on the data structure. Following Cohen et al. (2012), if the 
trade pattern of an insider is March 1, 2012, June 1, 2012, Sept. 1, 2012, and Dec. 1, 2012, his/her 
transactions are classified as routine trades. Besides, we also identify the trades made by an insider whose 
trading time interval is fixed as routine trades. 
25 For family control, we only report the results measured by family voting rights here. The results 




_o, and _o capture the insider sale effect for opportunistic 
transactions.  
Consistent with Cohen et al. (2012), for routine trades, we do not find any insider sale 
effect on abnormal short sales, indicating no information leakage from corporate 
insiders to short sellers regarding routine insider sales. While for opportunistic trades, 
we find that the intensity of short selling is positive and significant only in family-
controlled firms. Further evidence suggests the opportunistic insider trades in weakly 
controlled family firms drive abnormal short sales. When comparing the opportunistic 
trading effect between family and non-family insiders, we find that non-family insiders 
are more likely to leak information to outside investors. 
<Insert Table 2.9 about here> 
2.6.6.2 Insiders’ rank and abnormal short sales 
According to the information hierarchy hypothesis proposed by Seyhun (1986), insiders 
who are more knowledgeable about the overall operational activities of a firm, such as 
the chief executive officer (CEO) and the board of directors, are more successful 
predictors of future stock price movements. However, because they are more rigorously 
scrutinized, they may choose not to use their information advantage for trading (Jeng et 
al., 1999). 26We test whether short selling activity around insider trading depends on the 
rank of directors/executives. As the information hierarchy hypothesis suggests, the 
intensity in short selling decreases as the rank of insiders making the sale moves 
through the following categories: chief executive, chairman, other senior executives 
                                                             
26 The main question is that whether insiders can benefit from their information advantage. Some insiders 
are more inside than others. The chief executive, for example, is likely to have better information about 
the firm’s prospects than lesser officers. However, the CEO’s trades are likely to be carefully scrutinized, 





(chief financial officer/chief operating officer/chief investment officer/managers), 
executive directors, non-executive directors, and independent non-executive directors.27 
Table 2.10 reports the regression results for abnormal short sales depending on the 
insiders’ rank. In Panel A, we document significantly positive abnormal short sales for 
executive directors, but not for the chief executive and chairman. The results are, 
nonetheless, consistent with Jeng et al. (1999) and Fidrmuc et al. (2006). Fidrmuc et al. 
(2006) find that a CEO’s transactions exhibit the lowest information effects of all types 
of directors and Jeng et al. (1999) explain this phenomenon by arguing that CEOs are 
heavily scrutinized, leading them to trade cautiously.  
<Insert Table 2.10 about here> 
2.6.6.3 Alternative explanation for contrarian trading 
It is possible that insiders are speculating that the stock is temporarily overpriced, or are 
attempting to earn a premium for providing liquidity if there is temporary buying 
pressure on the stock.  We do not distinguish contrarian trading from information-based 
trading as it is possible that the contrarian trading by insiders can be based on private 
information. Therefore, all insider trading patterns including contrarian trading behavior 
can be a sign of information leakage. Our main focus is examining the abnormal short 
sales around insider sales to test whether there are information flows between insiders 
and short sellers. 
2.7 Conclusion  
                                                             
27 According to Chapter 3 of the Listing Rules and Guidance (Authorised Representatives, Directors, 
Board Committees and Company Secretary) disclosed by the HKEx, every board must include at least 
three independent non-executive directors, and at least one of the independent non-executive directors 




Using corporate insiders’ transaction records and daily short sales on the HKEx, we 
investigate the channel of information leakage from corporate insiders to short sellers. 
Our research design overcomes the identification challenge from distinguishing the 
information sources between corporate insiders and market makers, since the latter does 
not present in Hong Kong’s order-driven system. We find that even in the absence of 
market makers, short sellers initiate their short positions before insider sales are publicly 
reported. Among family firms, the intensity of short selling is a non-monotonic function 
of family control and trading by non-family insiders triggers stronger abnormal short 
sales, as compared to family insiders. 
Our empirical evidence suggests that even without the involvement of financial 
intermediaries who are largely alleged to be the source of information leakage in the US, 
short sellers can still respond and move faster than average investors. This indicates that, 
corporate insiders can be another source of information leakage in the capital markets, 
which calls for more underlying governance of a firm. We also provide evidence on 
conflicts of interests in family firms from insiders’ likelihood of information leakage. 
Our study is related to the strand of literature investigating potential conflicts of interest 
among family firms, which are complicated by factors such as culture-based family ties, 
shared family wealth, and nepotism (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Perez-Gonzalez, 
2006; Villalonga et al., 2015). Overall, insiders in firms with strong family control are 
less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. The conflict between family and non-
family insiders as a result of resentment towards family dominance and self-serving 




Chapter 3  
CEO Human Capital, Competitive Advantage and Institutional 
Investors 
3.1 Introduction 
According to the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), inimitable resources including 
assets, capabilities, processes, routines, and knowledge can be heterogeneously 
distributed across competing firms. Firms can acquire different resources to establish 
their own competitive advantage from the perspective of strategic management and 
these differences help explain why some firms consistently outperform others (Barney, 
1995, 2001). Extant literature suggests that firm-specific human capital, such as 
workers’ skills, employees’ education levels, and industry experience, can be a source 
of sustained competitive advantage (Hall, 1993; Coff, 1997; Hitt et al., 2003; Hatch and 
Dyer, 2004; Campbell et al., 2012). However, little attention has been drawn on how 
CEO human capital can shape a firm’s competitiveness. Drawing on the resource-based 
view, we develop an integrative framework to analyze how the CEO helps a firm obtain 
competitive advantage by providing resources to the firm through his/her human capital. 
A large body of literature has studied CEOs because they are the principal corporate 
decision makers and thus the key determinants of how firms are managed and how they 
perform (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Kaplan et al., 2012; 
Graham et al., 2013). Previous studies show that manager fixed effects, such as CEO 
overconfidence, general ability, and personal risk-taking, can significantly affect 
corporate policies like dividend payout, interest coverage, cost-cutting policy, 




Hirshleifer et al., 2012; Kaplan et al., 2012; Cain and McKeon, 2016). While every firm 
has a CEO, CEOs have contrasting styles and may bring different competitive 
advantage to firms. For example, when Contel Corporation announced its appointment 
of John N. Lemasters as the new CEO, the board stated that “his technical savvy sets 
him apart from other Contel executives, most of whom are accountants by training. He 
is a hip guy technologically . . .’’ In contrast, James V. Napier, Contel’s departing CEO 
and president, was said to have ‘‘exclusively financial’’ strengths (Huang, 2014). Thus, 
a CEO brings strengths to the firm that complement its core competence and that is how 
he/she adds to the firm’s competitive advantage.   
Superior managerial skills or social networks, as different types of CEO human capital, 
are difficult for competitors to imitate because they are developed mostly through CEO 
personal education and working experience (Harris and Helfat, 1997). Thus, the 
heterogeneity and imperfect transferability of these intangible resources brought by 
CEO human capital help the firm obtain sustainable competitive advantage. For 
instance, given the complexity and comprehensiveness of managerial work, industry-
specific and firm-specific knowledge is needed for proper corporate decision making 
(Custódio and Metzger, 2013; Huang, 2014; Hu and Liu, 2015; Miller et al., 2015). 
CEO social networks can widen the firm’s information channels, promote governance 
mechanisms, and reduce transaction costs in interfirm business (Granovetter, 1985; 
Uzzi, 1997, 1999; Adler and Kwon, 2002).  
This paper aims to shed light on the question of how CEO human capital can be a 
source of competitive advantage from the perspective of transaction cost economics 
(TCE) in particular (Williamson, 1975, 1985). One of the most important research 
questions in the field of firm theory revolves around whether to organize activities 




firms should internalize transactions when the transaction cost through contract is high 
and favor the market otherwise. Because TCE mainly concerns characteristics of 
exchange (e.g., specificity, uncertainty, frequency), it typically holds the firm’s 
resources and capabilities constant. Thus, what is missing from the TCE perspective is 
how the heterogeneity in firm-specific resources can influence the governance of 
exchange (Mayer and Salomon, 2006; Lo et al., 2012). We provide an approach to 
integrate the transaction cost economics with the resource-based view based on the role 
of CEO human capital in reducing transaction costs. 
Although CEO human capital can bring competitive advantage to firms in both 
developed and emerging economies, we choose to focus on emerging economies. 
Compared to developed markets, in the emerging market context, CEOs may serve a 
relatively more important function because they can help firms operate in a context of 
weak institutions, government control, and other constraints. In an emerging market 
where formal institutions such as laws and regulations are weak, managers’ resources 
can help firms perform basic functions more efficiently (Peng and Luo, 2000; Peng et 
al., 2015). As the literature suggests, the social capital embedded within the CEO’s 
attributes is more desirable in uncertain environment characterized by weak institutional 
support and distorted information when entering exchange relationships (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Powell, 1990). More interestingly, a distinct feature of institutional 
transitions like China is that “while market forces have certainly become more 
important, government influences are not necessarily in decline” (Li et al., 2013, p. 206). 
This gives rise to another important type of CEO human capital, political ties, in 
emerging markets (Li and Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2008; Shi et al., 2014). Thus, we take 
China as a representative study context of emerging markets to investigate whether the 




related experience and business ties, help him/her better cope with the environment and 
thus manage resources more efficiently.  
However, it is always a challenge to identify and measure competitive advantage 
brought by CEO human capital. We innovatively measure it from the financial market. 
CEO human capital draws great attention from shareholders as the superior skills and 
competencies embedded in the CEO’s human capital can help the firm better perform its 
strategic goals than its competitors, thereby generating higher returns for shareholders 
(Hitt et al., 1994). Previous studies also show that the human capital attributes of top 
executives can send strong signals to outside investors about the firm’s long-term 
performance (Mahajan and Lummer, 1993; Higgins and Gulati, 2003). Building on this, 
we ask whether CEO human capital, as a source of competitive advantage, along with 
the firm, industry, or market factors, can in part account for investors’ perceptions of the 
firm. 
Among all investors, we focus on institutional investors in particular. Compared to 
individual investors, institutional investors are more skilled with better access to market 
information and superior analyzing ability (Gibson et al., 2004; Alti and Sulaeman, 
2012; Edelen et al., 2016). More interestingly, institutional investors do not act as a 
homogeneous block but are financial intermediaries with extensive difference in terms 
of objectives and strategies, such as how long they hold a stock (Hoskisson et al., 2002). 
There are strong reasons to expect institutions with different investment strategies and 
horizons to display different attitudes toward sustainable competitive advantage brought 
by CEO human capital.  
Overall, this paper makes three contributions. First, we integrate the resource-based 




human capital in shaping a firm’s competitiveness. On one hand, TCE has been 
criticized for its inability to account for firm-specific capabilities and resources and how 
they matter to the design of interfirm exchange relationships (e.g., Mayer and Salomon, 
2006; Lo et al., 2012). On the other hand, the resource-based view has been criticized 
for being unable to offer a testable framework for how governance of the exchange 
matters in generating the firm’s competitive advantage (e.g., Williamson, 1999). Our 
study considers the role of CEO human capital in governance of the exchange so as to 
generate competitive advantage. Second, we argue that the governance mechanism of 
exchange brought by CEO human capital is more desirable in an emerging market. 
Specifically, in an emerging market context with weak institutions and missing markets, 
CEOs can make a more meaningful contribution to reducing transaction costs when 
dealing with both private economic agents and the government, whereas the governance 
mechanism mainly relies on laws and regulations to regulate the market behavior when 
institutions are strong. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
investigate the relationship between institutional investors’ perceptions of CEO human 
capital, which have implications for all shareholders. More interestingly, institutional 
investors do not act as a homogeneous block but are financial intermediaries with 
extensive heterogeneity in their objectives and strategies (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Ryan 
and Schneider, 2003), including how long they hold a stock. Given that different types 
of CEO human capital might bring in competitive advantages with various levels of 
sustainability, it is important to consider the heterogeneity of institutional investors 
when exploring their preference for top-management attributes. 
Drawing on the resource-based view, we examine whether institutional investors value 
competitive advantage brought by intangible CEO human capital. Informed by the 




exchange, our selection of the three sets of contingency variables, business ties, industry 
experience, and political ties, is driven by their relevance to market-based and political-
based exchange. Our findings suggest that CEOs’ business ties and industry experience 
matter more than their political ties in a sample of Chinese listed firms. The results also 
show that CEO characteristics that can enhance a firm’s competitive advantage are 
valued by long-term investors more than by short-term investors.   
3.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
3.2.1 CEO human capital, the resource-based view, and competitive advantage 
A firm’s profitability depends on its establishment of competitive advantage over its 
rivals as such advantage enables the firm to do things that lead to higher sales, lower 
costs, or in other ways add financial value to the firm (Grant, 1991). According to 
Barney (1991, 2001), the resource-based view emphasizes that heterogeneous resources, 
which are valuable, rare, and costly to imitate, are the sources of a firm’s competitive 
advantage. The differences in resources and further competitive advantage help explain 
why some firms consistently outperform others (Barney, 2001). Barney (1995) groups 
firm resources into four categories: financial, physical, human, and organizational. 
Among these, human resources include the knowledge, skills, experience, relationships, 
and intelligence of individuals associated with a firm.  
Under the resource-based view, CEO human capital, as firm-specific human resource, is 
assumed to contribute to a firm’s competitive advantage due to its inimitability based on 
its intangible, firm-specific, and socially complex nature (Castanias and Helfat, 1991; 
Harris and Helfat, 1997; Geletkanycz et al., 2001; Combs and Skill, 2003; Hatch and 
Dyer, 2004; Pandher and Currie, 2013; Peng et al., 2015). Generally, CEO human 




manage the firm (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). A broader definition also includes his/her 
social capital, which is “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within, 
available through, and derived from, the network of relationships possessed by an 
individual” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, p. 243), such as business and political ties 
embodied in the capabilities (Peng and Luo, 2000; Ployhart and Moliterno, 2011).  
Next, we analyze how CEO business ties, industry experience, and political ties 
embedded in CEO human capital, as internal firm resources, help a firm achieve 
competitive advantage by reducing transaction costs. 
3.2.2 Hypothesis development 
3.2.2.1 Business ties 
Powell’s (1990) analysis of exchange suggests that transactions can take place through 
loose collections of individuals who maintain impersonal and constantly shifting 
exchange ties, as in the market (arm-length), or through stable networks of exchange 
partners who maintain close social relationships (relationship-based). Compared to arm-
length transactions, relationship-based interfirm transactions can help the focal firm 
reduce transaction costs by limiting the opportunistic behavior of the exchange partners.  
Opportunism is an important behavior assumption in transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1981, 1985). TCE states that given the occasion, decision makers may 
seek “with guile” to serve their own interests and it is costly to distinguish opportunistic 
from non-opportunistic behavior ex ante. The governance problem of opportunism is 
more salient when the transaction has high asset specificity because the vulnerable party 




dedicated investment. As a result, opportunism of exchange partners can lead to market 
failure due to the high transaction cost. 
Transactions based on networks offer the advantage of reducing the threat of 
opportunism. Opportunistic behavior can only be an attractive option for the exchange 
partner when the potential benefits from it outweigh the costs. Due to the transferability 
of the social network, opportunistic behavior with any exchange partner can be easily 
captured by other partners connected to the network. This transferability leads to an 
additional cost of being opportunistic, which is a potential loss of transaction 
opportunities with all ties across the network. To a large extent, the more developed the 
business network, the higher the cost of network ostracism associated with opportunism. 
Therefore, exchange partners based on relationships are less likely to be opportunistic, 
which further reduces transaction costs.   
Managers’ business ties, contacts, and networks can be a source of competitive 
advantage by promoting relationship-based transactions. Embedded relationships within 
CEO business ties have three main components that regulate the expectations and 
behaviors of exchange partners: trust, fine-grained information transfer, and joint 
problem-solving arrangements (Uzzi, 1997). Trust can be considered as confidence that 
one partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the other (Barney and Hansen, 1995). 
This trust is built on repeated transactions via the network. The primary outcome of 
governance by trust is expressed as the belief that an exchange partner would not act in 
self-interest at another’s expense. Fine-grained information transfer benefits networked 
firms by increasing the breadth and ordering of their behavioral options and the 
accuracy of their long-run forecasts. With respect to joint problem-solving arrangements, 
relative to market-based mechanisms of alignment such as exit (Schwartz and 




solving mechanisms that enable actors to coordinate functions and work out problems. 
According to TCE, all these components join to tackle the problem of opportunistic 
behavior by business partners, thus reducing transaction costs for the firm. Based on the 
above argument, we formulate the first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: CEO business ties are a source of competitive advantage to the firm by 
reducing transaction costs in market-based exchanges. 
3.2.2.2 Industry-specific experience 
In addition to opportunism, TCE has another important behavior assumption: bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1957). Unlike the “economic agent,” to whom hyper-rationality is 
attributed, decision makers in the TCE framework are endowed with less powerful 
analytical and data-processing ability. Although bounded rationality does not claim 
these agents are irrational, it suggests their limited competence in formulating and 
solving complex problems and in processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) 
information (Simon, 1957; Williamson, 1981).    
Given bounded rationality, it is impossible for decision makers to deal with complexity 
in all contractually relevant aspects due to environment or behavior uncertainties. 
Before the signing of a contract, the screening of potential partners and negotiation of 
contracts cannot sufficiently cover all possible contingencies that may arise in the future. 
As a consequence, incomplete contracting is the best that can be achieved.  Following 
the signing of a contract, it can also be costly to monitor and verify the performance of 
the exchange party. Thus, the governance problem of performance evaluation arises as 
certain monitoring and contract enforcing mechanisms are executed to ensure 
compliance with obligations stipulated in the contract. Transaction costs associated with 




coordination costs before the contract and monitoring and enforcement cost after the 
contract.  
CEOs are important decision makers in formulating and enforcing contracts. CEOs’ 
previous industry-specific experience can contribute to a firm’s competitive advantage 
by improving decision makers’ bounded rationality and thus reducing transaction costs. 
First, industry experience equips the CEO with better capacity to screen and select 
potential exchange partners. For example, CEO knowledge about the industry permits a 
fairly sophisticated, although implicit process for screening potential partners. Second, 
when initiating contracts, specific industry knowledge enables CEOs to better gather 
and process information for more efficient strategic decision making in communication, 
negotiation, and coordination. Third, throughout the enforcement of the contract, 
industry-specific experience provides the CEO with knowledge and skills to monitor 
and evaluate performance. Empirical work documents that industry-specific expertise 
can enhance firm performance through more successful acquisitions (Custódio and 
Metzger, 2013), better matched divestiture decisions (Huang, 2014), and more efficient 
corporate investment (Hu and Liu, 2015). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: CEO industry experience is a source of competitive advantage for a firm 
by reducing transaction costs in market-based exchanges. 
3.2.2.3 Political ties 
In addition to a wide range of market-based exchanges with customers, suppliers, and 
competitors, firms are also involved in business-government exchange relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985; Faccio, 2006). The literature describes the process of business-
government exchange as firms offering government agencies and officials financial or 




Brewer, 1994; Bonardi et al., 2005). In this process, firms compete with each other for 
policy favors by employing various political strategies and those who have successful 
connections to the government can generate valuable political resources and then obtain 
non-market competitive advantage that cannot imitated by unconnected rivals. 
However, the business-government exchange can result in higher transaction costs than 
market-based exchanges (Bonardi et al., 2006; Kingsley et al., 2012). The absence of an 
explicit price mechanism to regulate the business-government exchange makes it more 
difficult to specify the potential uncertainties when writing the political contract. Also, 
due to governments’ relatively more powerful position, a significant political hazard 
may arise from their opportunistic behaviors as they are less binding to contract items. 
Consequently, a proper governance structure needs to be developed to reduce the 
transaction costs in political exchanges while they can help the firm acquire a non-
market competitive advantage.     
CEO political ties can help the firm secure a non-market competitive advantage by 
facilitating business-government exchanges and mitigating political hazards. In both 
developed and emerging economies, managers build ties not only with managers at 
other firms, but also with the government. CEO political ties, defined as political 
connections, are based on having personal ties with members of political party and the 
state (Peng and Luo, 2000; Sun et al., 2010, Wu et al., 2012). CEOs with political ties 
tend to know how to influence political decisions in favor of their firms and also how to 
co-opt political elites to manage resources (Brødsgaard, 2012; Shi et al., 2014). In 
addition, in view of the potential political hazards, the CEO’s political connections 
serves to develop trust between the firm and political parties, thereby reducing the 
transaction costs resulting from the higher possibility of opportunism compared to 




political ties can enhance firm value through favorable regulatory policies (Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003), higher chances of government bailout (Faccio et al., 2006), and easier 
access to financial resources such as bank loans (Claessens et al., 2008). Thus, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: CEO political ties are a source of competitive advantage to the firm by 
reducing transaction costs in political exchanges. 
3.3 Empirical Methods 
3.3.1 Empirical design 
We measure how competitive advantage brought by CEO human capital is valued from 
the perspective of institutional investors. Previous studies have highlighted that the 
attributes of top management can send strong signals to outside investors about the 
long-term performance of the firm (Mahajan and Lummer, 1993; Higgins and Gulati, 
2003). Sophisticated market participants such as institutional investors are in the best 
possible position to evaluate the importance of CEO characteristics to a firm’s 
performance and long-term growth, and the reactions of these investors should, 
therefore, provide us with information about whether or not intangible CEO 
characteristics are valued.  
Research on the preferences of institutional investors has focused on firms’ financial 
performance and corporate governance (Parrino et al., 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011; 
Chung and Zhang, 2011; Edelen et al., 2016). Not surprisingly, all institutional investors 
across the world have a strong preference for firms with good performance and good 
governance, such as larger firm size, higher book-to-market ratio and liquidity, and 




and Zhang, 2011; McCahey et al., 2016). However, previous studies also acknowledge 
that institutional investors are far from homogenous regarding their investment 
preferences. A distinguished feature is related to their investment horizon. Institutional 
investors may have different investment horizons as a result of differences in 
investment objectives, styles, and competitive pressures. Institutions with long-term 
investments have better knowledge of the firm and are more specialized in long-term 
future earnings (Chen et al., 2007; Bushee, 2001; Bushee et al., 2014). Long-term 
institutional investors tend to know better about the firm and care more about long-term 
growth opportunities rather than short-term trading benefits.  In contrast, short-term 
institutional investors tend to overweight short-term expected earnings but underweight 
long-term expected earnings (Yan and Zhang, 2009).  Thus, institutional investors’ 
perception of a firm’s competitive advantage can also depend on their investment 
horizon. 
Drawing from the potential performance implications of CEO human capital based on 
the resource-based view, we argue that a change in institutional investors’ shareholding 
is a good measure to explore whether they value a firm’s competitive advantage. The 
human capital factors and their hypothesized effects on a firm’s competitive advantage 






Figure 3.1 Graphical representation of the empirical design 
 
3.3.2 Sample 
To investigate whether institutional investors value CEO human capital, we select all 
the Zhong-Zheng 800 Index (CSI 800) constituent companies listed at the end of 2010 
as an initial sample.  The Zhong-Zheng 800 consists of 800 firms of all sizes listed in 
the Chinese A-share market, both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. 
Financial firms and firms that went public after 2004 are excluded.28 For the sample 
firms, we construct a manager-firm matched panel dataset, where we track individual 
CEOs across different firms from 2004 through 2010. For each CEO, we hand-collect 
his/her curriculum vitae from the firm’s annual report and the Sina finance website 
(http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/), which summarize CEO biographical information in 
a textual format. Finally, we obtain a sample of 467 firms with 775 individual CEOs.  
3.3.3 Variables 
3.3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
                                                             
28 Our data for institutional investors in China starts from 2004. Although the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) has started to introduce financial institutions as institutional investors since 2000, 




Among all institutional investors, we choose to focus on mutual funds, as they are the 
most market-based and independent. Other financial institutions, such as insurance 
companies, commercial banks, and securities companies, are considered less 
independent and less market-oriented because they have close business ties with the 
listed firms either as underwriters for the shares issued or providers of other financial 
services (Cornett et al., 2007; Yuan et al., 2009).  Based on interviews with top 
managers of financial institutions and boards of directors of listed firms, Yuan et al. 
(2009) confirm that mutual funds play a more active role in disciplining corporate 
management, while other institutions, like banks and securities companies, are passive 
shareholders.  
We obtain the quarterly holdings for each mutual fund in each firm from the China 
Stock Market Database (CSMAR). To measure overall annual institutional holdings for 
each firm, we aggregate the number of shares owned by all mutual funds for the same 
firm in the fourth quarter. The number of shares owned by all mutual funds as a 
percentage of a firm’s tradable shares is defined as institutional ownership.  
In addition to the overall holdings level, we classify institutional investors into long-
term and short-term investors based on their investment horizon. Following Gaspar et al. 
(2005, 2012), we use the annual average churn rate (ACR) to measure each institutional 
investor’s investment horizon, calculated by averaging the quarterly churn rate across 
four quarters in a year (see Appendix 2  for calculation details). Based on the ACR, for 
each year, we sort all institutional investors into three tertile portfolios. Those ranked in 
the top tertile (with the highest ACR) are classified as short-term institutional investors 
and those ranked in the bottom tertile (with the lowest ACR) are classified as long-term 
institutional investors. Given the horizon classification for each institutional investor, 




as long institutional ownership and the aggregated holdings by all short-term 
institutional investors as short institutional ownership. 
3.3.3.2 Main explanatory variables 
To measure CEO human capital, we manually decode detailed textual information based 
on the CEOs’ previous and current working experience from the biographical data in the 
curriculum vitae.   
Business ties are measured by the number of organizations a CEO has worked for 
throughout his/her career excluding government positions. By definition, business ties 
are a proxy for the CEO’s market-based social connections to other firms and 
organizations. Each working experience represents a specific social network that refers 
not only to the members of the organization but also to its external connections. CEOs 
who have worked in different firms bring with them knowledge gained through personal 
experiences with other firms’ policies and practices as well as relationships with former 
contacts and associates (Granovetter, 1985; Geletkanycz and Boyd, 2011; Hu and Liu, 
2015). As the connections within the same business group or conglomerate tend to 
highly overlap, we count multiple ties within the same business conglomerate as only 
one business tie.29 Based on the number of connections, we define business ties as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when it is above the average and 0 otherwise.30 Industry-
specific experience is measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO’s prior 
working organizations are in the same industry as the focal firm where he/she serves 
and 0 otherwise.31 Political ties are measured as a dummy variable that equals 1 when a 
                                                             
29 We also construct business ties in which different organizations in the same business conglomerate are 
counted as for a robustness check. The results are largely consistent and can be provided upon request. 
30 We also conduct a robustness check by measuring business ties as the number of organizations, which 
is a continuous variable. The results are largely consistent and available upon request. 




CEO has any central government, local government, military, or committee working 
experience and 0 otherwise.  
3.3.3.3 Control variables 
We also control for a series of other variables that can affect institutional holdings 
(Parrino et al., 2003; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). The financial 
data are downloaded from the China Stock Market Database (CSMAR). All control 
variables are calculated annually. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by the profit 
before interest and tax scaled by total assets. Return refers to the annual stock return. 
Market to book is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity. Firm age is calculated as the current year minus the start year of the firm. 
Volatility is the one-year stock volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. 
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total sales. Leverage is the book value 
of debt divided by the book value of equity. Controller refers to the type of ultimate 
controller; it is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when the controller is 
enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for individuals, and 0 otherwise. 
Independent indicates the number of independent directors as a percentage of the 
number of all members of the board of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of 
the shareholding of the largest shareholder. Duality is defined as a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. Previous studies also show 
that education experience is an important index for CEO human capital (e.g., Custódio 
and Metzger, 2013; Miller et al., 2015). Thus, we also control the CEO’s education 
level. Education is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when a CEO holds as 





All variable definitions are summarized in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 provides descriptive 
statistics and pairwise correlations of the variables used in the regression analysis. The 
magnitude of VIF is generally small, indicating that the probability of multicollinearity 
is relatively low.32 
<Insert Tables 3.1 and 3.2 about here> 
3.3.4 Models 
We apply panel data fixed-effects regressions to explore whether and how institutional 
investors value CEO human capital based on a manager-firm matched dataset. 33Our 
main dependent variable is the level of aggregated institutional ownership, which 
captures the percentage holding by mutual fund. The main explanatory variables are 
three types of human capital: business ties, industry experience, and political ties. We 
first test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 with each type of human capital in the regressions 
separately. Then we add industry experience and political ties to business ties. To test 
whether the investment horizon of institutional investors matters, we run separate 
regressions for firms with the dependent variable replaced by their long institutional 
ownership and short institutional ownership, respectively.  
A potential caveat of our study is that different types of CEOs may endogenously match 
with different types of firms. In this case, the resulting difference in institutional 
holdings may reflect firm-specific characteristics rather than a causal effect of CEO 
human capital. Based on robustness and potential endogeneity concerns, we identify a 
                                                             
32 We can use the VIF command after the regression to check for multicollinearity. VIF stands for 
variance inflation factor. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit 
further investigation. Tolerance, defined as 1/VIF, is used by many researchers to check on the degree of 
collinearity. A tolerance value lower than 0.1 is comparable to a VIF of 10. It means that the variable 
could be considered as a linear combination of other independent variables. In our case, our VIF values 
are smaller than 10 in Appendix Table A2.1. Therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in our study. 
33 The p-value for the Hausman Test is 0.000. The null hypothesis for Hausman Test is difference in 
coefficients is not systematic between fixed effects model and random effects model”. Based on the test, 




dummy variable, denoted as turnover, which equals 1 if a firm experiences CEO 
turnover in that year and 0 otherwise. Then, we construct interactions with turnover and 
different types of CEO human capital. This helps us capture any dynamic institutional 
holdings change resulting from differences in human capital between the old and new 
CEO, which makes the firm fixed effect a smaller concern as other firm characteristics 
are almost unchanged. Also, the interactions can measure the moderating effect of CEO 
turnover in terms of CEO human capital on institutional shareholding. 
In all models, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm 
level. All control variables are lagged for one year to mitigate the endogeneity problem. 
Year dummies are added to control for possible year-specific effects. To reduce the 
influence of outliners, each of these continuous variables is winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles.  
3.4 Results 
Table 3.3 presents the panel data regression results for the effect of CEO human capital 
on mutual fund ownership. We first run regressions with business ties, industry 
experience, and political ties in Models (1), (2), and (3) separately. Then, industry 
experience and political ties are added in Model (4). We also report regression results 
with the CEO turnover dummy and its interactions with different types of CEO human 
capital in Table 4. Models (1) and (2) in Table 3.4 document the dynamic institutional 
ownership change due to CEO turnover events without and with CEO human capital 
controlled, respectively. Model (3) includes three interactions between CEO turnover 
and human capital to test the moderating effect by CEO turnover. Table 3.5 summarizes 




dependent variable for Models (1) – (4) is the long institutional ownership and the 
dependent variable for Models (5) – (8) is the short institutional ownership. 
<Insert Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 about here> 
The focus of our research is to assess whether and how institutional investors value 
competitive advantage by different types of CEO human capital. In Hypothesis 1, we 
propose that CEO business ties are a source of competitive advantage to the firm. The 
positive and significant coefficients of business ties in Models (1) and (4) of Table 3.3 
provide strong support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that institutional investors do value 
the CEO’s business ties and CEOs with more business ties can attract more institutional 
investors. The moderating effect by CEO turnover34 is not significant in terms of 
business ties in Model (3) (Table 3.4). Given that the significantly positive coefficient 
of business ties still exists in Model (3) (Table 3.4), this indicates that institutional 
investors’ preference for CEO business ties is consistent regardless of the dynamic 
moderating effect of CEO turnover.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that institutional investors tilt their portfolios 
toward CEOs with industry experience, inferred by the significantly positive 
coefficients in Model (2) and Model (4) (Table 3.3). Also, there is no moderating effect 
of CEO turnover on industry experience in Model (3) (Table 3.4). Thus, Hypothesis 2 is 
strongly supported, which suggests that CEO industry experience is a source of 
competitive advantage for a firm. 
The results are more mixed with respect to Hypothesis 3. Overall, there is no impact of 
political ties on institutional ownership across the models in Table 3.3 (none of the 
coefficients of political ties is significant). We know that panel data regression captures 
                                                             
34 The negative effect of CEO turnover on institutional ownership is consistent with the previous literature 




the long-term effect of CEO human capital on institutional holding so the results 
suggest that political capital is not valued by mutual fund institutional investors over the 
long run. However, combined with the significantly negative magnitude of turnover 
effect and the positive magnitude of its moderating effect on political ties in Model (3) 
(Table 3.4), we note that institutional investors tend to increase their portfolio when 
facing a new CEO with political ties. Therefore, the valuation for political ties is not 
conclusive and depends on investors’ investment horizon. 
With respect to whether institutional investors’ horizon matters, we document that only 
long-term institutional investors value the CEO’s business ties and industry experience 
positively. In Model (1) (Table 3.5), the coefficients of business ties and industry 
experience are both economically and statistically significant, but neither is significant 
in Model (5) (Table 3.5). This suggests that institutional investors with a longer 
investment horizon prefer CEOs with more business ties and industry experience. As for 
political ties, first, the insignificant coefficients of political ties across all models (Table 
3.5) indicate that neither long-term institutional investors nor short-term institutional 
investors show any interest in CEO political ties over the long run. Interestingly, after 
comparing the moderating effect of CEO turnover on political ties in Model (4) and 
Model (8) (Table 3.5), we find that short-term institutional ownership levels rise as the 
newly appointed CEO’s political ties increase, but this is not the case for long-term 
institutional ownership. Thus, short-term institutional investors tend to tilt their 
investment toward CEOs with political ties in the short run but exhibit a similar 
preference for political ties as long-term institutional investors in the long run. 
The pattern of control variables in all models also largely corresponds to our 
expectations. The preference of institutional investors is widely studied, focusing on a 




Parrino et al., 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011; Edelen et al., 2016). 
Not surprisingly, all institutional investors across the world have a strong preference for 
firms with high performance. The positive and significant coefficient return is 
consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001). They record a positive relation between 
institutional ownership and future stock returns. Also, the positively documented 
market-to-book value suggests that institutional investors prefer firms with higher firm 
valuation. Similarly, Woidtke (2002) documents a positive relationship between a 
firm’s Tobin Q and the shareholding percentage of private pension funds. All this 
empirical evidence helps explain why institutional investors consistently prefer firms 
with higher ROA, return, and market-to-book value but lower volatility in our results.  
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
The study was motivated by a desire to understand the role of CEO human capital in 
creating a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage.  Drawing from the perspectives of 
resource-based view and transaction cost economics, we make a theoretical contribution 
by developing an integrated framework to analyze how CEO human capital helps a firm 
obtain competitive advantage in exchanges with business and political counterparts in 
emerging markets.  
In developed economies where formal institutions are strong, the governance 
mechanism of exchanges primarily relies on laws and regulations. However, this study 
highlights the importance of CEO human capital as an informal mechanism for 
governance of exchanges in emerging markets characterized by distorted information 
and weak institutional support (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Powell, 1990). In the 
context of emerging markets, CEOs often have to perform some basic functions in 




and Palepu, 1997; Peng and Luo, 2000; Peng et al., 2015). Manager’s on-going 
interactions and collaborations among them cultivate trust, and such relationship norms 
constrain exchange partners’ opportunistic behaviors and reduce transaction costs. 
CEO’s political connections with the government provides firms with critical access to 
policy and industrial sector information (Hillman et al., 1999) in the emerging markets 
where governments guide economic activities by setting regulatory policies.  
Empirically, we innovatively measure the competitive advantage brought by CEO 
human capital in the financial market. Among all investors, we focus on institutional 
investors in particular and examine whether they capture the value of CEO human 
capital. For a sample of Chinese listed companies, we find that institutional investors 
prefer firms whose CEOs have more business ties and industry experience in the long 
run, while their preference for political capital is more likely to be short term. In 
particular, this preference heterogeneity for different types of CEO human capital is 
more pronounced for short-term institutional investors. Compared to long-term 
investors, short-term investors do not value the competitive advantage brought by CEO 
business ties and industry experience. The increase in short-term investors’ dynamic 
marginal holdings due to political capital change around CEO turnover represents their 
compliance with a short investment horizon.  
In the Chinese context, despite decades of market-based reforms, officials at various 
levels of the government still have some power to allocate resources (e.g., land, bank 
loans, subsidies). The conventional wisdom states that CEOs should build connections 
with business partners and government officials. Therefore, in many Chinese firms, 
political ties are regarded as a firm’s strategic asset as it can help the firm overcome 
market and institutional barriers, seek political favors, and thus manage resources more 




exhibit bigger and longer capabilities. We reason that with a long-term orientation, CEO 
business ties and industry experience should have a stronger impact than political ties. 
CEO political ties lack an effective mechanism to ensure sustainable competitive 
advantage. For example, government officials often rotate their positions across 
different departments and geographic locations, which weakens the firm’s political 
connections. In such cases, political ties can even become a liability if incoming 
government officials represent a rival political group (Siegel, 2007). Therefore, 
sophisticated institutional investors are less interested in political connections. While 
the role of government has been changed from guiding (e.g, setting regulatory policies) 
to facilitating economics activities in China’s transition into market economy, our 
suggestions is that Chinese firms and managers now should reply more on building ties 
among themselves and develop more tacit knowledge and experience. 
Although a large body of literature has documented the performance impact of CEO 
human capital, the reluctance of accountants to extend the boundaries of balance sheets 
beyond tangible assets partly reflects the difficulties of valuation. The heterogeneity and 
imperfect transferability of intangible resources also precludes the use of market prices. 
Our study offers valuable implications for policy makers and financial market investors 
at larger. Intangible resources such as CEO human capital provide shareholder value 
and should be integrated in financial reporting.  
Our study has its limitations. This research provides an incomplete test of the role of 
human capital in building a firm’s competitive advantage in governance of exchange 
relationships. In particular, we only focus on the CEO attributes and capabilities 
embedded in their human capital. There are many different groups of employees inside 
organizations that can create competitive advantage (Lepak and Snell, 1999; Collins and 




also from non-CEO executives and other employees. Further research should examine 





















Chapter 4  
Do Institutional Investors Use their “Voice”? Evidence from their 
Impact on Product Differentiation 
4.1 Introduction 
The classic industrial organisation literature (Hotelling, 1929; Shaked and Sutton, 1987; 
Nevo, 2000; Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012; Hoberg and Phillips, 2015) suggests 
that vertical product differentiation is a key determinant of a firm’s industrial 
competitiveness and profitability. Vertical product differentiation increases consumer’s 
willingness to pay by creating unique products that appeal to consumers. To enhance 
consumers’ willingness to pay for their respective products, firms incur sunk costs 
including R&D expenditures devoted to product development or improvement, and 
advertising outlays aimed at increasing perceived quality (Sutton, 1991). The main idea 
of product differentiation is that R&D and advertising activities are effective in reducing 
ex-post product similarity.  
However, it is possible that two firms within one industry may have the same intensity 
of R&D and/or advertising expenditures, yet be different in their product innovation 
outcomes and then industry position. In certain situations, higher R&D expenditures 
would probably indicate a greater level of agency costs, and not necessarily better 
product innovation. 35 While prior literature has studied the effect of R&D and 
advertising expenditure on a firm’s industrial position (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979; 
Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991; Motta, 1992; Ofek and Sarvary, 2003), the 
                                                             
35 Approximately three-fourths of R&D investments by firms in the United States are devoted to product 
R&D (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Firms choose their investments in product R&D and these innovation 
investments determine the degree of differentiation between their products (Dixit, 1979; Singh and Vives, 




governance issue on these expenditures has received little attention. We aim to 
investigate whether the governance of the sunk costs, R&D and advertising expenses in 
particular, affects the outcome of product differentiation, focusing on the role of 
institutional investors.   
A key factor in global capital markets is the fast growing dominance of institutional 
investors. Institutional activism is by no means as a new phenomenon as institutions 
have become the majority of owners of most large US corporations. 36Institutional 
investors’ involvement in corporate management can range from voice to exit 
(Hirschman, 1970; Parrino et al., 2003; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008; McCahery, 2016). Although the effect of institutional investors on firm’s 
performance is widely recognized in the literature (e.g., Kochhar and David, 1996; 
Edmans, 2009; Hall and Lerner, 2010), less well-studied is the role played by 
institutional investors in the governance of innovation of publicly traded firms. If 
incentive contracts for managers cannot fully overcome the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems, increased monitoring by institutional investors can improve incentives 
to innovate by “insulating” the manager against the consequences of bad income 
realizations. However, monitoring is costly and therefore the influence of institutional 
shareholders on firm strategy is an open empirical question.   
Although previous literature does not distinguish the effects of R&D and advertising 
expenditures on corporate outcomes such as market value, systematic risk and the 
success of products (Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991; Motta, 1992; Chauvin and 
Hirschey, 1993; Ofek and Sarvary, 2003; McAlister et al., 2007; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 
2009), the monitoring influence of institutional investors on R&D and advertising can 
                                                             
36  For example, the proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen steadily over the 





be different. Firstly, the monitoring of R&D activity is inherently more difficult than 
advertising. Advertising is usually more specifically targeted and its outcome is less 
uncertain and easier to be expected. While the outcome of R&D is more difficult to 
define, measure or expect and depends on the relative movement in innovation 
strategies of other firms in the industry, resulting the incomplete contract for managers. 
The lack of accurate measurement of objective or target in R&D makes the monitoring 
of institutional investors more difficult. Also, compared to advertising, R&D activities 
can also cause higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
which makes the monitoring more challenge. For example, the evaluation of R&D 
projects involves more technical or scientific skills which are difficult for average 
investors (Mina et al., 2013). 
Secondly, the possibility to induce subsequent managerial actions to reflect institutional 
monitoring of R&D is lower compared to advertising. As the periodical progress and 
outcome is easy to observe and evaluate, the monitoring of institutional investors can 
motivate the managers to refocus and improve their advertising plan or strategy during 
the advertising campaign. In contrast, it is difficult to evaluate the periodical progress of 
R&D unless the product is successfully developed. This makes it less capable to adjust 
the strategy during the R&D process. Thus, based on these, it is possible that the 
monitoring of institutional investors in R&D expenses is less effective than advertising 
expenses. 
Our analysis focuses on the effect of shareholding by institutional investors on sunk 
costs (R&D and advertising), which is measured by ex-post product similarity (Hoberg 
and Phillips, 2015). This novel firm-year level measure, which is based on product 
descriptions from annual firm 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange 




that traditional measures of market structure could bear. Our analysis distinguishes 
between R&D expenditures and advertising expenditures, as well as between active and 
passive institutional shareholders who arguably make different choices between voice 
and exit. Overall, there are reasons to expect that not all institutional investors share the 
same preference for activism due to the monitoring cost. Independent and foreign 
institutions are credited more with taking a more active stance (lower monitoring cost), 
while other institutions that have business relations with local companies may feel 
compelled to be loyal to management (higher monitoring cost). The active institutional 
investors are more likely to collect information and face less regulatory restrictions or 
have fewer potential business relationships with the focal firm they invest in. While 
institutions like banks, insurance companies, pension fund and other institutions (e.g., 
trust, endowments) are more likely to be passive (Brickley et al.,1988; Almazan et al., 
2005). Their existing or potential business relationship of these institutions with the 
firms they invest in tend to make these groups more pressure-sensitive with respect to 
corporate governance. By examining evidence regarding the effects of these investors 
on corporate innovation outcomes, and by including differences among institutions in 
their ability to influence these outcomes, we are able to investigate competing 
hypothesis about the role of institutional investors in promoting firm’s industry 
competitiveness. 
Consistent with our conjecture that institutional investors’ monitoring can promote 
product innovation, we find that given certain expenditures, the presence of institutional 
ownership can help improve firm’s industry position by decreasing product similarity. 
However, this relationship only holds for advertising but not for R&D as the monitoring 
effect of institutions on R&D projects is very limited. After classifying institutional 




advertising is mainly contributed by active institutional investors, rather than passive 
institutional investors. Interestingly, in addition to their monitoring role on R&D and 
advertising expenses, we also find institutional investors, especially active institutional 
investors tend to discourage product differentiation overall. This evidence draws further 
implications on how the presence of institutions affects corporate strategies, in 
particular industry competitiveness.  
Our study makes three important contributions to the literature. Firstly, we extend the 
industrial organisation literature (Hotelling, 1929; Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Nevo, 2000; 
Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012; Hoberg and Phillips, 2015) by interacting industrial 
competitiveness with corporate governance. Under Sutton’s (1991) framework, R&D 
and advertising expenditure as sunk costs can create unique products that appeal to 
quality-sensitive consumers, thus creating endogenous barriers to entry. However, they 
and the following researchers fail to consider that the governance of these expenditures 
after they are incurred can affect the productivity of product innovation and thus firm’s 
industry position. Our study improves previous research by examining how firm level 
governance characteristics on these expenditures can affect their contribution to product 
differentiation. 
Secondly, we highlight the influence of institutional investors on product market 
dynamics through their monitoring role on R&D and advertising expenditure.  As a 
result of the growing dominance of institutional investors, their impact on corporate 
decisions and performance such as firm value, CEO turnover, merge and acquisition and 
dividend policy is widely discussed in the literature (Parrino et al., 2003; Chen et al., 
2007; Ferreira et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2016), but there is less 
attention on how the presence of institutional investors can affect product market 




first study focusing on the relationship between institutional ownership and product 
differentiation, which offers new insight on the monitoring role of institutional investors 
in corporate governance.  
Lastly, to examine to what extent institutions monitoring works, we distinguish the 
effect of R&D and advertising expenditure on product differentiation. Previous 
literature tends to treat R&D and advertising expenditures equally on corporate 
outcomes such as market value, systematic risk and the success of products (Shaked and 
Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991; Motta, 1992; Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993; Ofek and 
Sarvary, 2003; McAlister et al., 2007; Fosfuri and Giarratana, 2009). However, given 
the more incomplete contract of R&D projects compared to advertising, we argue that 
the complexity and outcome of the monitoring by institutional investors are different 
across R&D and advertising.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents literature 
review and hypothesis development. Section 4.3 describes the data, descriptive statistics 
and methodology. Section 4.4 discusses the empirical results and robustness checks. 
Section 4.5 concludes the paper. 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Product differentiation 
Product differentiation is an effective way for firms to seek competitive edge in a 
competitive market. Hotelling (1929) and Chamberlin (1933) famously show that 
product differentiation is fundamental to profitability and theories of industrial 
organisation. Later, several theoretical models are built to permit a unified treatment of 




customers’ willingness to pay for their respective products (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 
1979; Shaked and Sutton, 1987; Sutton, 1991; Motta, 1992). These fixed costs include, 
in particular, the case of R&D expenditures devoted to product development or 
improvement, and the case of advertising outlays aimed at increasing perceived quality. 
For example, Shaked and Sutton (1987) build a theoretical model based on a two-stage 
process, where firms incur sunk costs choosing or developing their products at the first 
stage. Then, at the second stage, taking product specifications as fixed, they compete in 
prices. These two stages combines to promote product differentiation. The first stage is 
the time for firms to incur R&D or advertising costs and the second stage is to measure 
ex-post product market performance. Sutton (1991) also predicts that advertising and 
R&D can create endogenous barriers to entry through product differentiation. Overall, 
the extent of product differentiation is the outcome of prior R&D and advertising 
expenditure by the firm. 
4.2.2 Institutional investors 
Institutional investors could affect managers’ decisions through various mechanisms 
such as the threat of exit, activism and voice, media use to pressure the management, 
direct negotiations with management and behind-the-scenes discussions with 
management or directors. Among these mechanisms, direct monitoring is the most 
prevalent ones documented in the literature (Hirschman, 1970; Parrino et al., 2003; 
Almazan et al., 2005; Gillan and Starks, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Ferreira et al., 
2010; Aggarwal, 2011; McCahery, 2016).  
Compared to small and atomistic investors, shareholders with large shareholdings like 
large institutions are better motivated to monitor managers because the benefits that 




they bear (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Also, with a large 
ownership position of institutional investors over the firm, the management should care 
more how trading by these institutions affects their overall stock price and firm 
valuation if they are not happy with the corporate management (Hotchkiss and 
Strickland, 2003; Parrino et al., 2003). Therefore, large holdings enable institutional 
investors to be more capable of exerting greater influence on managerial decisions. 
Furthermore, sophistication of institutional investors allows them to collect firm 
information which can facilitate their monitoring more easily than average investors. 
But there are reasons to expect that not all institutional investors share the same 
preference for activism due to the monitoring cost. Independent and foreign institutions 
are credited more with taking a more active stance, while other institutions that have 
business relations with local companies may feel compelled to be loyal to management. 
The empirical studies indicate that mutual funds and independent investment advisors 
are more likely to active or pressure-resistant monitors (Brickley et al.,1988; Almazan et 
al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). The active institutional investors 
are more likely to collect information and face less regulatory restrictions or have fewer 
potential business relationships with the focal firm they invest in. While institutions like 
banks, insurance companies, pension fund and other institutions (e.g., trust, 
endowments) are more likely to be passive (Brickley et al.,1988; Almazan et al., 2005). 
Their existing or potential business relationship of these institutions with the firms they 
invest in tend to make these groups more pressure-sensitive with respect to corporate 
governance. Alternatively, the business connections between the institutions and the 
portfolio firms incur higher monitoring cost for these institutions. 




Prior literature tends to treat R&D and advertising as the same type of expenditure in 
terms of investment productivity. For example, Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) provide 
evidence that advertising and R&D expenditures have large, positive and consistent 
influences on the market value of the firm. Ofek and Sarvary (2003) find that firms 
invest in R&D and marketing in an attempt to attain industry leadership, thus securing 
high profits and benefiting from advantages relevant for the success of future product 
generations. McAlister et al. (2007) hypothesize that a firm’s advertising and R&D 
expenditures create intangible assets that insulate it from stock market changes, 
lowering its systematic risk. Fosfuri and Giarratana (2009) investigate the impact of 
rivals’ product innovation and new advertising on a firm’s financial market value in 
mature product markets. Although R&D and advertising expenditure can both 
contribute to product differentiation, they are different in the nature of inducing CEO 
efforts and corporate governance.  
Firstly, the monitoring of R&D activity is inherently more difficult than advertising. 
Advertising is usually more specifically targeted and its outcome is less uncertain and 
easier to be expected. While the outcome of R&D is more difficult to define, measure or 
expect and depends on the relative movement in innovation strategies of other firms in 
the industry, resulting the incomplete contract for managers. The lack of accurate 
measurement of objective or target in R&D makes the monitoring of institutional 
investors more difficult. Also, compared to advertising, R&D activities can also cause 
higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders which makes the 
monitoring more challenge. For example, the evaluation of R&D projects involves more 
technical or scientific skills which are difficult for average investors (Mina et al., 2013). 
Secondly, the possibility to induce subsequent managerial actions to reflect institutional 




outcome is easy to observe and evaluate, the monitoring of institutional investors can 
motivate the managers to refocus and improve their advertising plan or strategy. In 
contrast, it is difficult to evaluate the periodical progress of R&D unless the product is 
successfully developed. This makes it less capable to adjust the strategy during the 
R&D process. Thus, based on this, it is possible that the monitoring of institutional 
investors in R&D expenses is less effective than advertising expenses. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis development 
Based on above literature, we build our argument about the role of institutional 
investors in the governance of R&D and advertising expenditure and then the outcome 
of product development. 
Given certain R&D and/or advertising investment, the productivity in facilitating 
product differentiation can depend on whether institutional investors monitor the firm 
by taking an active stance or just vote with their feet when unhappy with the corporate 
management. If institutional investors play an active monitoring role in the governance 
of R&D and advertising expenditure, they are more likely to exert a positive impact on 
the productivity of such investment as managers should induce more efforts if they are 
heavily monitored. In this sense, if incentive contracts for managers cannot fully 
overcome their adverse selection and moral hazard problems, increased monitoring by 
institutional investors acts as additional mechanism to enforce managerial efforts. 
However, the effectiveness of institutional monitoring can vary across R&D and 
advertising activities. Advertising is naturally easier to monitor as the proposals are 
more fully developed and the outcome is less uncertain. In contrast, the monitoring of 
R&D process is more complicated and difficult. Thus, it is possible that institutional 




The willingness of institutional investors to monitor R&D and advertising can also 
depend on their type. Compared to passive institutional investors, the activism of active 
institutional investors can help better induce managerial efforts and reduce information 
asymmetry thus improving the efficiency of R&D and advertising investment.   
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample and data sources 
We use firm-year level data on product differentiation, institutional ownership, R&D 
and advertising between 2000 and 2015. We start with Bloomberg, which covers 
accounting information for all US public firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. 
Our primary measure for R&D and advertising for firm i in year t is firm i’s annual 
R&D and advertising expenditure. The R&D and advertising expenses are also obtained 
from Bloomberg. It is worth noting that through our sample period some firms report 
missing R&D expenses. Following the literature (Chan et al., 2001; Hou et al., 2016), 
we only include firm-year observations with non-negative expenditures in the sample. 
We then match these data with measures for product similarity (Hoberg and Phillips 
Library) and institutional ownership (Thomson). Finally, we obtain 7,106 firm-year 
observations. 
4.3.1.1 Dependent variables 
Hoberg and Phillips (2015) develop a new algorithm to study how firms differ from 
their competitors using new time-varying measures of product similarity (Text-based 
Network Industry Classification, TNIC). This data is based on web-crawling and text 
parsing algorithms that process the text in the business descriptions of 10-K annual 




accurate, as Item 101 of Regulation S-K legally requires that firms describe the 
significant products they offer to the market. These descriptions help form new industry 
classifications based on the cluster of product market vocabulary among firms operating 
in the same market. Because the new time-varying measures of product similarity are a 
function of 10-K business descriptions, their classifications are based on the products 
that firms supply to the market, rather than production processes (as is the case for 
existing industry classification schemes). Therefore, their measure is an ex-post 
descriptions, which must also be updated and representative of the current fiscal year of 
the 10-K. The resulting database is based on all publicly traded firms (domestic firms 
traded on either NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX).  
Hoberg and Phillips (2015) calculate firm-by-firm pairwise similarity scores by parsing 
the product descriptions from the firm 10Ks and forming word vectors for each firm to 
compute continuous measures of product similarity for every pair of firms in each year 
(a pairwise similarity matrix). For any two firms i and j, this algorithm generates a 
product similarity, which is a real number in the interval [0, 1] describing similarity 
between the words used by firms i and j. Based on this, TNIC3TSIMM is a total 
similarity score which describes the total product similarity of a firm within the industry. 
It is a valid measure of market structure and market power. A higher score of 
TNIC3TSIMM indicates that the text of the firms' business descriptions has more 
common vocabulary than a firm with a lower score and is negatively related to pricing 
power.   
Hoberg and Phillips (2015) use this new classification and show that it is better at 
explaining the cross-section of firm characteristics. Their research also reveals that 
firms and industries move considerably within the product space over time, and they 




Classifications, including SIC, NAICS. Compared to traditional industry classifications, 
TNIC are more likely to capture continuous measures of product market similarity and 
relatedness both within and across industries. The TNIC database is a non-transitive 
network and every firm has a unique industry. As such, the concentration index created 
from the TNIC has advantages in measuring product market characteristics than other 
traditional market competition measures like HHI, which is calculated from 
COMPUSTAT. Most importantly, it is at the firm-year level rather than industry-year 
level. According to the summary statistics in Table 2, the average product similarity 
index across our sample is 3.236 and the standard deviation is 3.927. 
4.3.1.2 Main explanatory variables 
For institutional ownership, we obtain the quarterly holding data on 13-F filings from 
Thomson. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), all institutions 
that investment discretion over $100 million in equity assets are required to file a Form 
13-F on a quarterly basis. Also, all common stock holdings of 10,000 or more shares or 
having a value of $200,000 or more must be reported. The institutional ownership data 
includes the name of each institutional investor, the number of shares owned and the 
number of shares outstanding. We calculate the percentage of outstanding shared held 
by each institution by taking the number of shares owned as the number of shares 
outstanding. As the institutional holdings are reported quarterly, we take the holding at 
the fourth quarter as the annual institutional holding for each investor. Then, we 
aggregate the annual shareholding for all institutional investors in a firm as the firm 
level annual institutional ownership, denoted as Inst_Own. 
Thomson records all institutions into five types: banks (type code = 1, narrowly defined 




“commercial banks”), insurance companies (type code = 2), investment companies 
(type code = 3, mostly mutual fund management companies), independent investment 
advisors (type code = 4, including asset management companies, investment banks, 
brokers, private wealth management companies, etc.), and others (type code = 5, 
including pension funds, endowment funds, most of the hedge funds, financial arms of 
corporations, and others). Following the literature (Brickley et al.,1988; Almazan et al., 
2005; Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008), we classify investment companies 
and independent investment advisors (type code= 3 and 4) as active/pressure-resistant 
institutional investors and all other types as passive/pressure-sensitive institutional 
investors. We aggregate the holding by all passive institutional investors as passive 
institutional ownership denoted as Inst_Own_Passive and aggregate the holding by all 
active institutional investors as active institutional ownership denoted as 
Inst_Own_Active. In Table 2, we find the average institutional ownership for all sample 
firms over 2000 and 2015 is 53.4%. Among them, active institutional ownership 
accounts for 43.1% and passive institutional ownership accounts for 10.2%. This 
suggests that the dominance of active institutional investors is more prevalent. 
We obtain firm level R&D expenses and advertising expenses from Bloomberg. The 
Positive R&D Dummy is a dummy variable, which equals one for firms having non-
zero R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise. Similarly, the Positive Advertising 
Dummy is a dummy variable, which equals one for firms having non-zero advertising 
expenditures, and zero otherwise. This allows us to examine the effects of having R&D 
and advertising projects on product similarity without the influence from accounting 
standards regarding entering R&D and adverting expenses. 




We also control for a series of firm characteristics that can affect product similarity.  
According to the industry organisation literature mentioned above (e.g., Ofek and 
Sarvary, 2003), the firm’s position in the industry is a key determinant of market power 
and product differentiation. We measure a firm’s industry position as Ind_Position, 
which is a dummy variable that equals one when the sales of a firm are is above the 
median sales within the industry (Standard Industry Classification). Log Assets is the 
logarithm of total assets. Log PPE is the logarithm of net plant, property and equipment. 
Log Market value is the logarithm of market capitalization.  
All variable definitions are summarized in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 provides descriptive 
statistics and pairwise correlations of the variables used in the regression analysis. The 
magnitude of VIF is generally small, indicating that the probability of multicollinearity 
is relatively low. 
<Insert Tables 4.1 and 4.2 about here> 
4.4 Models 
We apply regression models to explore the role of institutional investors in promoting 
product differentiation through monitoring R&D and advertising expenses. The 
regression models include product similarity index (TNIC3TSIMM) as the dependent 
variable and institutional ownership (Inst_Own), R&D (Positive R&D Dummy) and 
advertising (Positive Advertising Dummy) as the main explanatory variables. These 
variables (Inst_Own, Positive R&D Dummy and Positive Advertising Dummy) measure 
the direct effects of institutional ownership, R&D and advertising projects on product 
differentiation. As our main focus is whether the presence of institutional investors can 
improve the innovation outcomes given certain R&D and advertising expenditure, we 




interaction terms capture the indirect and moderating effect of institutional holding on 
product differentiation given certain level of innovation expenses. Ofek and Sarvary 
(2003) discuss how being a leader impacts a firm’s investment productivity, defined as 
the marginal change in the probability of winning the next round of product success. 
This suggests that a firm’s industry position can also affect its innovation productivity. 
Thus, we also interact industry position with R&D dummy and advertising dummy 
separately to investigate the indirect and moderating effect of industry position on 
product differentiation after controlling R&D and advertising expenses.  
In all models, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm 
level. All explanatory and control variables are lagged for one year to mitigate the 
endogeneity problem. Year dummies and industry dummies (Standard Industry 
Classification) are added to control for possible year-specific and industry-specific 
effects. To reduce the influence of outliners, each of these continuous variables is 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
4.5 Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Aggregated institutional ownership, R&D, Advertising and product 
differentiation 
Table 4.3 reports the regression results of product similarity on aggregated institutional 
ownership, R&D dummy, advertising dummy and the interactions of institutional 
ownership with two dummies respectively. The coefficient of institutional ownership in 
Model (1) is 1.246 (significant at the 1% level). This shows the direct effect of 
institutional ownership on product similarity without any controls. Overall, the presence 




(with the coefficient 0.964 for Inst_Own) after controlling other firm characteristics like 
assets value, property, plant and equipment and market value in Model (2).  
Following Sutton (1991) and Hoberg and Phillips (2015), we introduce positive R&D 
dummy and positive advertising dummy in Model (3), which measures the direct effects 
of R&D and advertising on product differentiation. Sutton (1991) predicts that firm’s 
industry similarity and profitability changes over time as they incur sunk costs such as 
R&D and advertising and these costs can create endogenous barriers to entry. A key 
assumption of his framework is that R&D and advertising (which might be geared 
toward improving product appeal), are effective in reducing ex-post product similarity. 
In Model (3), the coefficient of Positive R&D Dummy is -0.600. Thus, we document a 
significantly negative relationship between R&D and product similarity, which suggests 
that the firms with non-zero R&D are more competitive within the industry as they 
display a lower product similarity. However, we do not find advertising is significantly 
associated with a decrease in ex-post product similarity. 
To test our main hypotheses, we construct the interaction of institutional ownership with 
R&D dummy and then with advertising dummy, respectively. Given certain R&D 
expenses, the coefficient of the interaction between institutional investors and R&D 
dummy should be significantly negative if the monitoring of institutional investors can 
improve the productivity of R&D expenses by reducing product similarity. Similarly, 
given certain advertising expenses, the coefficient of the interaction between 
institutional investors and advertising should be significantly negative if the monitoring 
of institutional investors can improve the productivity of advertising expenses by 
reducing product similarity. Interestingly, in Model (4), we find that the coefficient of 
interaction between institutional ownership and advertising is significantly negative, 




similarity through monitoring advertising expenses. However, we do not document any 
significant relationship for the monitoring of institutional investors on R&D.  
As the firm’s industry position largely determines its product characteristics, we later 
include a firm’s industry position in Model (5). The coefficient of industry position is -
0.502 and significant at the 1% level. In line with the intuition, we document that firms 
with higher industry position, i.e., industry leaders, exhibit lower product similarity than 
firms with lower industry position, i.e., industry followers. As mentioned above, firm’s 
industry position can affect their innovation outcomes. Therefore, in Model (6), we also 
introduce the interaction of industry position with R&D and advertising, separately. The 
coefficient of the interaction between industry position and R&D is -0.729, which is 
significantly negative, indicating that given certain R&D expenses, the productivity of 
R&D in reducing product similarity is higher for industry leaders in contrast with 
industry followers. However, the coefficient 2.370 of the interaction between 
institutional ownership and advertising is not significant.  
Consistent with previous literature (Aghion et al, 2013; Hoberg and Phillips, 2015),  we 
find that firm size (Log Assets, Log Market Value) is negatively correlated with product 
innovation outcome and  capital (Log PPE) is positively correlated with product 
innovation outcome. 
<Insert Table 4.3 about here> 
4.5.2 Passive and active institutional ownership, R&D, advertising and product 
differentiation 
In Table 4.3, we document that the direct effect of the presence of institutional investors 




matters for their role in product differentiation, we then classify institutional investors 
depending on whether they are active or passive. In Table 4, we find the negative effect 
of institutional investors on product differentiation is largely due to the active 
institutional investors. The coefficients of Inst_Own_Active in Model (1) and Model (2) 
(1.448 and 1.153, respectively) are positively significant at the 1% level, while the 
coefficient of Inst_Own_Passive is not significant. This suggests that it is mainly active 
institutional investors that discourage firm’s product differentiation.  
After interacting passive institutional ownership with R&D and advertising separately, 
we find neither of them are significant. This proves that the monitoring effect of passive 
institutional investors on product innovation process is limited. As we hypothesize, the 
existing or potential business relationships of these institutions with the firms make this 
group more pressure-sensitive with respect to corporate governance. Alternatively, the 
business connections between the institutions and portfolio firms incur higher 
monitoring cost for these institutional investors who tend to take a passive monitoring 
position. 
In contrast, active institutional investors play a more active role in inducing managerial 
efforts but their monitoring effect is only effective towards advertising rather than R&D. 
The coefficient of the interaction between Inst_Own_Active and Positive Advertising 
Dummy in Model (4) is -8.554 (significant at the 5% level). However, the coefficient of 
the interaction between Inst_Own_Active and Positive R&D Dummy in Model (4) is 
not significant. The different results between R&D and advertising in the interactions 
with institutional ownership show that the monitoring effectiveness is different in 
financing projects with different degrees of uncertainty and information asymmetry. 





This study investigates the extent to which institutional investors can shape a firm’s 
industrial competitiveness through their effect on the governance of R&D and 
advertising expenditures. Our evidence suggests that institutional investors can promote 
product differentiation by monitoring managers and mitigating the problems associated 
with the incomplete contracts. We also find the monitoring role of institutional investors 
is effective in the governance of advertising, but does not affect the firm’s industry 
competitiveness through the governance of R&D. Finally, we classify institutional 
investors into active and passive groups and show that the monitoring role is dominated 
by the active group. 
We highlight the influence of institutional investors on product market dynamics 
through their monitoring role on R&D and advertising expenditures. As a result of the 
growing dominance of institutional investors, their impact on corporate decisions and 
performance, such as firm value, CEO turnover, merge and acquisition and dividend 
policy, is widely discussed in the literature (Parrino et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2007; 
Ferreira et al., 2010; Aggarwal et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2016). However, less attention 
has been paid to whether institutional investors’ activism can increase a firm’s industrial 
competitiveness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to focus on the 
relationship between institutional ownership and product differentiation, which offers 
new insights on the monitoring role of institutional investors in corporate governance.  
We also extend the industrial organisation literature (Hotelling, 1929; Shaked and 
Sutton, 1987; Nevo, 2000; Gowrisankaran and Rysman, 2012; Hoberg and Phillips, 
2015) by interacting industrial competitiveness with corporate governance. Under 




unique products that appeal to quality-sensitive consumers, thus creating endogenous 
barriers to entry. However, existing studies do not consider the investigate the impact of 
the governance issue relating to R&D and advertising expenditures on the productivity 
of product differentiation and a firm’s industry competitiveness. Our study takes a step 
further by examining how the governance of such expenditures affects product 
differentiation. 
Lastly, we distinguish the effect of R&D from advertising expenditures on product 
differentiation. This distinction provides a unique opportunity to examine the 
effectiveness of institutional investor activism. We argue that because R&D projects are 
riskier and more complex than advertising, institutional investors will be less effective 
in monitoring R&D than advertising. 
Our study has limitations. As we take the product differentiation as the outcome of 
product innovation and a better outcome of innovation is induced by the managerial 
efforts. However, managerial efforts cannot be observed directly, the results can only 





Chapter 5  
Conclusion and Discussion 
Firstly, we study potential information leakage from corporate insiders to short sellers 
by examining abnormal short sales around insider transactions. Our results suggest that 
short sellers initiate their short positions before insider sales are publicly reported (i.e., 
ahead of average investors), indicating the potential for information leakage. 
Interestingly, in family controlled firms, the intensity of short selling exhibits a non-
monotonic function of family control rights: it increases with family control in general, 
but weakens for firms with higher levels of family control. After distinguishing insider 
sales placed by family members from those placed by non-family insiders, we find that 
transactions by non-family insiders trigger larger abnormal short sales than those by 
family insiders. Furthermore, following Cohen et al. (2012), we conduct a sub-sample 
analysis by distinguishing between routine and opportunistic insider trades, as 
opportunistic ones are more likely to result from private information. We find greater 
abnormal short selling volume for opportunistic trades for weakly controlled family 
firms and by non-family insiders.  
The main argument in favor of informed trading by insiders and short sellers is that it 
conveys private information to the capital market, thus allowing better price discovery 
and improving market efficiency (Jaffe, 1974; Seyhun, 1986; Leland, 1992; Chang et 
al., 2007; Boehmer and Wu, 2012). However, the superior return predictability of 
informed trading can undermine the confidence of average investors and further limit 
capital market development. Our empirical evidence suggests that even without the 
involvement of the market makers who are largely alleged to be the source of 




market participants. Our research also provides additional evidence related to 
information leakage due to the potential conflict of interests in family firms. 
Secondly, we find evidence that institutional investors prefer firms whose CEOs have 
more business ties and industry experience in the long run, while their preference for 
political capital is more likely to be short term. In particular, this preference 
heterogeneity for different types of CEO human capital is more pronounced for short-
term institutional investors. Compared to long-term investors, short-term investors do 
not value the competitive advantage brought by CEO business ties and industry 
experience. That their dynamic marginal holdings increase due to political capital 
change around CEO turnover represents their compliance with a short investment 
horizon.  
Although a large body of literature has studied whether CEO human capital can help 
firms increase performance, the reluctance of accountants to extend the boundaries of 
corporate balance sheets beyond tangible assets partly reflects the difficulties of 
valuation. The heterogeneity and imperfect transferability of most intangible resources 
also precludes the use of market prices. We measure the value of intangible resources 
such as CEO human capital from the shareholder perspective on value, which 
contributes to the literature of firm valuation. We also show that institutional investors 
are heterogeneous in their actions and strategies and demonstrate that the investment 
horizon explains some of the differences in investor decisions. 
Thirdly, consistent with our conjecture that institutional investors’ monitoring can 
promote product innovation, we find that given certain expenditures, the presence of 
institutional ownership can help improve firm’s industry position by decreasing product 




monitoring effect of institutions on R&D projects is very limited. After classifying 
institutional investors into active and passive groups, we find that the monitoring effect 
of advertising is mainly contributed by active institutional investors, rather than passive 
institutional investors. 
Interestingly, in addition to their monitoring role on R&D and advertising expenses, we 
also find institutional investors, especially active institutional investors tend to 
discourage product differentiation overall. This evidence draws further implications on 
how the presence of institutions affects corporate strategies, in particular industry 
competitiveness. Also, we find the product outcome of R&D depends on firm’s initial 
industry position. The R&D investment productivity measured by product 
differentiation tends to be greater for industry leaders but lower for followers within the 
industry. Thus, given certain R&D expenditure, the leaders can make better use of it to 
innovate than the followers. However, we do not document significant difference in the 
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Table 1.1  
CEO, Insider and Institutional Stock Holdings as Percent of Total Shares Outstanding Worldwide 








Advertising 251 14.52% 23.49% 27.45% 
Aerospace/Defense 222 6.37% 35.11% 15.61% 
Air Transport 158 3.96% 25.65% 11.85% 
Apparel 1171 14.02% 14.60% 33.88% 
Auto & Truck 128 6.04% 21.00% 9.53% 
Auto Parts 642 9.22% 19.38% 21.77% 
Bank (Money Center) 623 1.15% 20.57% 8.35% 
Banks (Regional) 889 1.51% 28.82% 10.63% 
Beverage (Alcoholic) 223 10.24% 19.63% 17.79% 
Beverage (Soft) 103 4.94% 19.30% 21.27% 
Broadcasting 142 9.80% 27.63% 18.04% 
Brokerage & Investment Banking 569 12.03% 18.15% 28.92% 
Building Materials 434 8.29% 23.05% 22.75% 
Business & Consumer Services 772 9.95% 30.53% 26.46% 
Cable TV 63 4.12% 28.25% 11.03% 
Chemical (Basic) 774 9.48% 14.28% 22.84% 
Chemical (Diversified) 81 1.24% 27.77% 9.05% 
Chemical (Specialty) 731 8.09% 21.29% 19.54% 
Coal & Related Energy 278 5.34% 15.25% 16.70% 
Computer Services 929 11.06% 21.29% 25.62% 
Computers/Peripherals 327 8.96% 22.09% 18.57% 
Construction Supplies 757 6.36% 20.08% 17.00% 
Diversified 356 6.56% 22.44% 19.17% 
Drugs (Biotechnology) 884 5.05% 26.12% 15.21% 
Drugs (Pharmaceutical) 971 8.68% 19.93% 20.22% 
Education 174 11.31% 24.37% 24.72% 




Electronics (Consumer & Office) 153 9.65% 18.71% 21.33% 
Electronics (General) 1239 8.74% 19.86% 20.78% 
Engineering/Construction 1118 8.93% 20.01% 21.20% 
Entertainment 353 12.73% 16.85% 26.82% 
Environmental & Waste Services 306 9.74% 21.83% 24.77% 
Farming/Agriculture 388 9.62% 17.31% 21.09% 
Financial Svcs. (Non-bank & 
Insurance) 
1016 7.06% 24.68% 20.64% 
Food Processing 1275 10.29% 18.28% 23.52% 
Food Wholesalers 128 9.13% 19.01% 22.89% 
Furn/Home Furnishings 307 12.39% 20.33% 28.53% 
Green & Renewable Energy 179 7.33% 17.01% 16.63% 
Healthcare Products 677 6.71% 28.66% 20.09% 
Healthcare Support Services 334 10.37% 28.55% 23.61% 
Heathcare Information and 
Technology 
322 9.87% 28.19% 22.79% 
Homebuilding 173 10.98% 34.41% 20.44% 
Hospitals/Healthcare Facilities 192 8.85% 32.18% 24.15% 
Hotel/Gaming 658 9.73% 22.23% 21.40% 
Household Products 494 13.70% 20.24% 28.65% 
Information Services 186 5.62% 37.78% 17.68% 
Insurance (General) 233 7.17% 28.99% 15.19% 
Insurance (Life) 123 1.38% 34.09% 8.21% 
Insurance (Prop/Cas.) 227 2.91% 38.35% 14.77% 
Investments & Asset Management 1013 9.95% 27.02% 22.90% 
Machinery 1270 9.03% 21.03% 22.29% 
Metals & Mining 1517 5.36% 11.97% 17.42% 
Office Equipment & Services 159 11.36% 21.39% 26.56% 
Oil/Gas (Integrated) 49 1.28% 25.55% 3.49% 
Oil/Gas (Production and 
Exploration) 




Oil/Gas Distribution 210 3.88% 31.59% 7.71% 
Oilfield Svcs/Equip. 544 7.04% 26.95% 15.27% 
Packaging & Container 395 12.74% 20.10% 29.85% 
Paper/Forest Products 296 7.32% 19.70% 21.21% 
Power 569 3.19% 22.26% 8.48% 
Precious Metals 961 4.69% 16.69% 15.82% 
Publishing & Newspapers 364 7.52% 23.70% 22.85% 
R.E.I.T. 527 2.01% 53.23% 6.74% 
Real Estate (Development) 746 14.83% 14.79% 28.45% 
Real Estate (General/Diversified) 420 10.78% 17.36% 19.14% 
Real Estate (Operations & 
Services) 
606 9.32% 23.25% 22.27% 
Recreation 307 10.41% 22.75% 21.28% 
Reinsurance 38 2.34% 44.78% 6.20% 
Restaurant/Dining 346 10.20% 30.52% 20.57% 
Retail (Automotive) 163 11.31% 27.34% 24.17% 
Retail (Building Supply) 50 4.48% 32.24% 16.76% 
Retail (Distributors) 929 10.22% 21.76% 25.40% 
Retail (General) 220 6.70% 24.93% 13.25% 
Retail (Grocery and Food) 163 6.56% 22.27% 17.18% 
Retail (Online) 190 12.88% 28.15% 26.33% 
Retail (Special Lines) 505 10.71% 29.99% 24.71% 
Rubber& Tires 87 9.69% 16.48% 19.66% 
Semiconductor 535 6.83% 22.81% 15.05% 
Semiconductor Equip 258 10.60% 23.15% 18.90% 
Shipbuilding & Marine 326 6.37% 17.29% 14.23% 
Shoe 89 9.45% 20.90% 28.89% 
Software (Entertainment) 120 13.15% 16.79% 26.86% 
Software (Internet) 830 13.79% 22.88% 28.15% 




Steel 737 9.50% 15.40% 22.96% 
Telecom (Wireless) 106 5.05% 23.90% 12.23% 
Telecom. Equipment 480 8.45% 22.50% 19.14% 
Telecom. Services 297 8.45% 25.17% 17.17% 
Tobacco 59 10.38% 26.11% 13.48% 
Transportation 221 11.13% 22.03% 18.16% 
Transportation (Railroads) 49 0.24% 31.33% 3.07% 
Trucking 195 7.71% 28.31% 19.39% 
Utility (General) 57 2.45% 40.82% 5.59% 
Utility (Water) 96 2.21% 24.32% 8.92% 
Total Market 42678 8.55% 22.50% 20.83% 
Total Market (without 
financials) 
37762 8.90% 22.23% 21.33% 
Source: Date updated: 05-Jan-17; Created by: Aswath Damodaran   
Data website:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html   
Companies in each industry:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/indname.xls  
Variable definitions: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/variable.htm 





Table 1.2  
CEO, Insider and Institutional Stock Holdings as Percent of Total Shares Outstanding in the US 








Advertising 41 10.75% 24.11% 27.18% 
Aerospace/Defense 96 3.44% 53.40% 12.64% 
Air Transport 18 1.97% 63.98% 5.62% 
Apparel 58 11.64% 53.00% 22.34% 
Auto & Truck 15 16.27% 68.51% 22.27% 
Auto Parts 63 7.92% 55.91% 16.76% 
Bank (Money Center) 10 0.22% 55.06% 6.96% 
Banks (Regional) 645 1.86% 32.24% 12.50% 
Beverage (Alcoholic) 25 16.46% 37.90% 33.76% 
Beverage (Soft) 36 5.72% 19.84% 22.93% 
Broadcasting 30 8.97% 55.09% 25.09% 
Brokerage & Investment Banking 45 7.29% 61.31% 16.09% 
Building Materials 41 4.44% 64.60% 9.63% 
Business & Consumer Services 165 6.44% 54.01% 18.73% 
Cable TV 14 6.62% 46.94% 15.42% 
Chemical (Basic) 45 7.89% 31.03% 21.39% 
Chemical (Diversified) 8 0.70% 78.60% 2.17% 
Chemical (Specialty) 100 2.33% 54.20% 10.28% 
Coal & Related Energy 38 2.27% 18.85% 10.93% 
Computer Services 117 7.71% 47.65% 19.86% 
Computers/Peripherals 55 5.96% 41.49% 11.71% 
Construction Supplies 51 5.55% 70.78% 9.42% 
Diversified 24 6.60% 56.25% 8.72% 
Drugs (Biotechnology) 426 3.79% 35.88% 11.66% 
Drugs (Pharmaceutical) 164 5.66% 36.10% 15.42% 




Electrical Equipment 119 7.79% 32.26% 19.81% 
Electronics (Consumer & Office) 24 12.74% 24.46% 26.67% 
Electronics (General) 164 5.40% 42.52% 15.56% 
Engineering/Construction 48 4.27% 62.72% 10.94% 
Entertainment 79 10.69% 33.74% 24.71% 
Environmental & Waste Services 89 6.25% 34.94% 21.81% 
Farming/Agriculture 37 7.12% 42.88% 18.50% 
Financial Svcs. (Non-bank & 
Insurance) 
258 3.89% 37.39% 12.32% 
Food Processing 87 7.04% 53.16% 18.00% 
Food Wholesalers 16 5.10% 54.66% 11.40% 
Furn/Home Furnishings 30 10.50% 52.65% 28.16% 
Green & Renewable Energy 25 5.64% 34.70% 14.42% 
Healthcare Products 254 4.45% 41.34% 14.14% 
Healthcare Support Services 121 8.95% 50.26% 21.04% 
Heathcare Information and 
Technology 
125 8.67% 43.44% 18.50% 
Homebuilding 33 5.03% 73.94% 9.99% 
Hospitals/Healthcare Facilities 38 7.16% 63.76% 15.92% 
Hotel/Gaming 69 7.27% 47.11% 20.99% 
Household Products 129 13.05% 32.73% 25.38% 
Information Services 64 5.64% 62.98% 14.57% 
Insurance (General) 19 4.87% 60.93% 15.64% 
Insurance (Life) 22 2.14% 63.97% 6.44% 
Insurance (Prop/Cas.) 50 3.22% 60.49% 12.78% 
Investments & Asset Management 156 10.73% 45.70% 18.80% 
Machinery 127 4.21% 63.60% 11.48% 
Metals & Mining 97 7.00% 19.55% 17.39% 
Office Equipment & Services 24 3.45% 56.32% 9.91% 




Oil/Gas (Production and 
Exploration) 
330 7.03% 33.21% 15.17% 
Oil/Gas Distribution 78 0.39% 43.11% 2.81% 
Oilfield Svcs/Equip. 148 6.79% 50.16% 12.76% 
Packaging & Container 26 4.68% 74.40% 11.53% 
Paper/Forest Products 23 1.79% 68.92% 6.37% 
Power 68 1.84% 59.95% 5.21% 
Precious Metals 109 6.57% 18.60% 18.16% 
Publishing & Newspapers 37 2.63% 57.58% 15.27% 
R.E.I.T. 238 1.57% 73.67% 4.42% 
Real Estate (Development) 18 7.52% 45.15% 46.85% 
Real Estate (General/Diversified) 11 6.79% 46.20% 19.23% 
Real Estate (Operations & 
Services) 
54 14.28% 32.73% 27.15% 
Recreation 66 8.79% 56.49% 18.02% 
Reinsurance 3 0.53% 74.71% 2.50% 
Restaurant/Dining 86 4.52% 64.68% 11.63% 
Retail (Automotive) 25 1.31% 72.05% 8.82% 
Retail (Building Supply) 6 0.08% 66.83% 13.19% 
Retail (Distributors) 88 12.51% 56.33% 21.76% 
Retail (General) 19 5.79% 79.07% 12.09% 
Retail (Grocery and Food) 14 9.94% 52.70% 23.68% 
Retail (Online) 57 10.11% 54.29% 23.77% 
Retail (Special Lines) 108 4.26% 67.40% 14.34% 
Rubber& Tires 4 0.52% 63.86% 1.33% 
Semiconductor 80 2.76% 62.35% 7.20% 
Semiconductor Equip 45 1.99% 58.18% 10.24% 
Shipbuilding & Marine 11 10.28% 40.47% 22.52% 
Shoe 10 1.52% 64.55% 8.35% 




Software (Internet) 297 10.50% 37.63% 24.32% 
Software (System & Application) 236 7.77% 47.49% 19.90% 
Steel 38 4.03% 55.57% 7.14% 
Telecom (Wireless) 17 7.26% 41.11% 12.88% 
Telecom. Equipment 107 4.84% 48.49% 11.55% 
Telecom. Services 67 6.32% 42.45% 16.98% 
Tobacco 22 14.67% 41.13% 19.87% 
Transportation 17 3.49% 70.76% 11.29% 
Transportation (Railroads) 7 0.18% 58.29% 0.75% 
Trucking 30 8.19% 68.38% 26.53% 
Utility (General) 18 0.14% 74.89% 0.55% 
Utility (Water) 22 1.12% 34.99% 7.32% 
Total Market 7330 5.69% 46.70% 15.10% 
Total Market (without 
financials) 
6100 6.10% 48.50% 15.51% 
Source: Date updated: 05-Jan-17; Created by: Aswath Damodaran   
Data website:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html   
Companies in each industry:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/indname.xls  
Variable definitions: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/variable.htm 




Table 1.3  
CEO, Insider and Institutional Stock Holdings as Percent of Total Shares Outstanding in China 








Advertising 30 22.57% 12.75% 30.15% 
Aerospace/Defense 18 4.69% 15.65% 10.54% 
Air Transport 17 7.08% 14.42% 9.63% 
Apparel 194 18.39% 11.85% 27.07% 
Auto & Truck 31 3.04% 11.22% 9.42% 
Auto Parts 103 13.83% 11.37% 22.65% 
Bank (Money Center) 22 1.20% 16.50% 3.97% 
Banks (Regional) 20 0.02% 11.76% 1.35% 
Beverage (Alcoholic) 42 16.71% 14.13% 9.97% 
Beverage (Soft) 4 6.95% 17.52% 37.74% 
Broadcasting 7 21.81% 12.91% 25.02% 
Brokerage & Investment Banking 71 17.34% 10.10% 19.60% 
Building Materials 43 9.75% 10.11% 24.49% 
Business & Consumer Services 63 17.95% 9.94% 33.19% 
Cable TV 11 0.03% 8.49% 7.36% 
Chemical (Basic) 174 12.00% 9.19% 20.99% 
Chemical (Diversified) 8 0.65% 12.97% 19.61% 
Chemical (Specialty) 141 14.58% 11.26% 22.77% 
Coal & Related Energy 48 14.01% 11.23% 17.93% 
Computer Services 100 16.10% 13.43% 29.30% 
Computers/Peripherals 42 13.68% 9.97% 28.14% 
Construction Supplies 126 4.46% 11.70% 14.03% 
Diversified 24 1.95% 14.08% 16.48% 
Drugs (Biotechnology) 35 13.05% 15.12% 22.07% 
Drugs (Pharmaceutical) 197 11.34% 12.87% 19.25% 
Education 13 16.14% 14.22% 30.12% 
Electrical Equipment 207 12.90% 10.93% 24.23% 
Electronics (Consumer & Office) 34 14.09% 11.01% 22.93% 
Electronics (General) 212 12.53% 13.26% 25.48% 
Engineering/Construction 142 17.88% 13.20% 23.07% 
Entertainment 48 8.64% 7.82% 28.08% 
Environmental & Waste Services 48 15.87% 11.23% 27.45% 
Farming/Agriculture 53 10.93% 15.63% 18.12% 
Financial Svcs. (Non-bank & 
Insurance) 
56 16.48% 8.47% 33.78% 
Food Processing 152 17.29% 13.26% 22.25% 
Food Wholesalers 9 3.76% 17.11% 22.40% 
Furn/Home Furnishings 68 13.31% 15.54% 25.00% 
Green & Renewable Energy 25 6.27% 9.60% 9.74% 
Healthcare Products 40 11.63% 12.51% 28.73% 




Heathcare Information and 
Technology 
11 29.07% 12.94% 41.18% 
Homebuilding 5 0.05% 3.62% 27.64% 
Hospitals/Healthcare Facilities 8 13.17% 24.86% 33.37% 
Hotel/Gaming 86 13.32% 11.19% 16.97% 
Household Products 60 19.72% 10.56% 32.36% 
Information Services 9 8.15% 6.28% 27.51% 
Insurance (General) 4 0.00% 14.92% 8.01% 
Insurance (Life) 5 0.03% 26.63% 0.53% 
Insurance (Prop/Cas.) 3 0.07% 10.03% 58.12% 
Investments & Asset Management 34 21.10% 23.23% 27.86% 
Machinery 251 13.06% 10.86% 25.15% 
Metals & Mining 99 7.21% 10.74% 19.12% 
Office Equipment & Services 12 15.62% 12.39% 44.29% 
Oil/Gas (Integrated) 5 2.18% 11.42% 1.52% 
Oil/Gas (Production and 
Exploration) 
20 23.29% 10.15% 30.46% 
Oil/Gas Distribution 13 43.62% 11.47% 32.79% 
Oilfield Svcs/Equip. 50 14.00% 12.93% 22.74% 
Packaging & Container 57 25.85% 12.99% 33.09% 
Paper/Forest Products 45 9.53% 9.95% 16.76% 
Power 77 2.17% 14.20% 4.30% 
Precious Metals 25 6.28% 9.14% 19.16% 
Publishing & Newspapers 48 1.56% 13.27% 14.31% 
R.E.I.T. 2 0.09% 27.59% 0.15% 
Real Estate (Development) 200 22.97% 11.72% 23.73% 
Real Estate (General/Diversified) 80 10.74% 11.79% 14.75% 
Real Estate (Operations & 
Services) 
69 9.15% 8.03% 24.18% 
Recreation 45 21.97% 11.02% 26.29% 
Reinsurance 1 0.00% 1.98% 0.00% 
Restaurant/Dining 31 19.03% 12.26% 33.13% 
Retail (Automotive) 21 14.91% 11.10% 31.11% 
Retail (Building Supply) 3 34.10% 0.18% 39.29% 
Retail (Distributors) 130 16.86% 9.77% 24.15% 
Retail (General) 66 13.93% 10.22% 13.17% 
Retail (Grocery and Food) 17 13.73% 13.17% 22.09% 
Retail (Online) 3 47.25% 7.29% 21.44% 
Retail (Special Lines) 56 20.80% 11.97% 30.71% 
Rubber& Tires 12 18.93% 12.59% 12.10% 
Semiconductor 62 8.51% 12.53% 21.26% 
Semiconductor Equip 10 5.74% 17.05% 16.45% 
Shipbuilding & Marine 47 2.97% 12.04% 7.41% 
Shoe 25 17.23% 13.54% 33.54% 




Software (Internet) 50 14.96% 15.71% 34.82% 
Software (System & Application) 91 10.12% 12.49% 26.00% 
Steel 95 11.83% 9.69% 16.56% 
Telecom (Wireless) 6 17.40% 12.12% 35.62% 
Telecom. Equipment 93 11.93% 11.88% 23.83% 
Telecom. Services 18 4.44% 16.09% 16.56% 
Tobacco 0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Transportation 51 12.19% 12.21% 13.61% 
Transportation (Railroads) 6 0.02% 14.25% 4.84% 
Trucking 18 6.07% 12.19% 12.50% 
Utility (General) 4 0.00% 9.64% 9.92% 
Utility (Water) 31 3.82% 11.67% 10.52% 
Total Market 5008 13.86% 11.86% 22.53% 
Total Market (without 
financials) 
4751 14.00% 11.91% 22.79% 
Source: Date updated: 05-Jan-17; Created by: Aswath Damodaran   
Data website:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/data.html   
Companies in each industry:http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/pc/datasets/indname.xls  
Variable definitions: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/variable.htm 






 Dataset Selection Procedure 
  Multiple transactions executed by the same person on one day are recorded as one transaction and the 
transaction size is consolidated. Insider sales within 20 days of earnings and dividend announcements are 
eliminated. When multiple transactions are made by one insider within 30 consecutive days, only the first 
transaction is retained. Stocks that are ineligible for short selling are excluded. Financial firms such as 
banks, insurance companies, investment funds, and real estates are also excluded. A sample of 1,148 
observations for 254 firms is finally obtained. 
 
Sample selection procedure Obs. Firms 
Open market sale transactions for all insiders  7,921 726 
Consolidated transactions for each insider on the same day 7,736 726 
Excluding sales within 20 days of dividend and earnings announcements 5,915 671 
Excluding multiple sales executed within 30 consecutive days for each insider 2,546 667 
Excluding stocks that could not be short sold during the sample period 1,341 320 






Table 2.2  
Summary Statistics for Directors’ Trades, Large Controlling Shareholders, and Family Control 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for transaction size by category of director from January 2009 to 
December 2014. The transaction size is measured by the number of shares traded as a percentage of the 
number of shares outstanding. Other senior executives include the chief financial officer, chief operating 
officer, chief investment officer, and managers. Panel B records the summary statistics for the controlling 
power of large controlling shareholders. For family-controlled firms, this is measured as the voting rights 
by all family shareholders; for state-controlled firms, it is measured as the voting rights by the state; for 
non-controlled firms, it is measured as the voting rights held by the largest substantial shareholder. Panel 
C shows the summary statistics for family control in family firms. Family board seats is the number of 
family members sitting on the board. Family board presence (%) is the number of family members sitting 
on the board as a percentage of the total number of board members. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for transaction size by category of director (%) 
 Obs. Mean Median 1% 99% Std.Dev. 
Chairman 231 1.474 0.063 0.001 13.658 3.066 
Chief executives 115 0.980 0.044 0.000 19.500 3.203 
Other senior executives 92 0.057 0.023 0.000 0.621 0.102 
Executive directors 414 0.327 0.021 0.000 6.944 1.757 
Non-executive directors 118 0.383 0.030 0.000 6.307 1.227 
Independent directors 178 0.018 0.006 0.000 0.197 0.045 
All insiders 1,148 0.509 0.022 0.000 11.326 2.023 
Panel B: Summary statistics for the controlling power of large controlling shareholders (%) 
 Obs. Mean Median 1% 99% Std.Dev. 
Family-controlled firms 141 51.186 50.320 30.690 79.140 13.494 
Non-controlled firms 72 20.785 21.580 1.477 29.880 6.447 
State-controlled firms 41 51.549 51.990 21.000 77.900 14.855 
Panel C: Summary statistics for family control in family firms 
 Obs. Mean Median 1% 99% Std.Dev. 
Family board seats  141 1.766 1.000 0.000 6.000 1.340 











Table 2.3  
Summary Statistics for Event and Firm Characteristics 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics from January 2009 to December 2014 for all firms, then family-controlled firms, non-controlled firms, and state-controlled firms. Insider 
sale events per firm stands for the number of insider sales per firm over the sample period. Insider transaction size (%) is measured by the number of shares traded as a 
percentage of the number of shares outstanding. Short selling volume per day (%) refers to the daily short selling volume per firm as a percentage of the number of shares 
outstanding across the sample period. Event day short selling volume (%) is the daily short selling on the insider sale date as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding. 
Average short selling volume (%) is the average daily short selling volume in the [-30, -11] window before the insider sale date as a percentage of the number of shares 
outstanding. Panel B reports the summary statistics and correlation matrix for firm characteristics. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market value. Book to market 
is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is 
measured as the daily bid price minus the daily ask price, divided by the average of the daily bid and ask prices.  is the cumulative daily short selling volume 
during the five days prior to the insider sale date as a percentage of firm’s shares outstanding.  measures the cumulative daily abnormal size-adjusted returns 
during the five days prior to the insider sale date.  is the size-adjusted abnormal returns on the insider sale date. * The correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level. 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics for event characteristics 
      Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled 
      (No. of firms=141) (No. of firms=72) ( No. of firms=41) 
 Mean Median 1% 99% Std.Dev.    
Insider sale events per firm 4.520 2.000 1.000 25.000 5.032 4.326 5.042 4.269 
Insider transaction size (%) 0.509 0.022 0.000 11.326 2.023 0.561 0.579 0.184 
Short selling volume per day (%) 0.022 0.009 0.000 0.202 0.046 0.023 0.024 0.021 
Short selling volume on the event day (%) 0.024 0.006 0.000 0.262 0.060 0.020 0.026 0.035 
Average short selling volume [-30,-11] (%) 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.118 0.027 0.016 0.019 0.021 
Panel B: Summary statistics and correlation matrix for firm characteristics 





Firm size 22.488 22.488 18.300 26.774 1.684       
Turnover 14.880 15.047 9.852 18.584 1.770 0.126*      
Bid-ask spread 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.047 0.011 -0.333* -0.156*     





0.157 0.069 0.000 1.350 0.339 -0.011 0.209* -0.090* -0.002   
 
0.013 0.001 -0.214 0.426 0.107 -0.009 0.150* 0.008 0.096* 0.039*  
 




Table 2.4  
Abnormal Short Sales Volume around Insider Sales  
Panel A reports the daily abnormal short sales in the [-10, +10] event window for insider trades for all 
firms, family-controlled firms, non-controlled firms, and state-controlled firms. The insider sale day is 
defined as day 0. Abnormal short sales (%) is measured by daily short sales minus average short sales in 
the [-30, -11] estimation window as a percentage of the number of shares outstanding. Panel B reports the 
cumulative daily abnormal short sales for all firms, family-controlled firms, non-controlled firms, and 
state-controlled firms in the [0,1], [0,2], [0,3], [1,2], and [1,3] event windows. The t-test tests whether 
daily abnormal short sales and cumulative ones are different from zero. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Daily abnormal short sales volume around insider sales 
 All firms Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled 
 No. of events=946 No. of events=494 No. of events=300 No. of events=152 
Day Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
-10 -0.0007 -0.69 0.0016 1.23 -0.0047*** -2.77 -0.0001 -0.05 
-9 -0.0000 -0.02 0.0014 0.78 -0.0022 -1.01 -0.0002 -0.09 
-8 -0.0009 -0.71 -0.0004 -0.23 -0.0032* -1.68 0.0019 0.45 
-7 -0.0028*** -2.99 -0.0024* -1.69 -0.0043*** -2.82 -0.0014 -0.65 
-6 -0.0008 -0.73 -0.0007 -0.49 -0.0019 -1.07 0.0008 0.20 
-5 -0.0014 -1.09 -0.0020 -1.21 -0.0023 -1.07 0.0020 0.45 
-4 -0.0002 -0.14 0.0007 0.34 -0.0001 -0.06 -0.0030 -1.43 
-3 -0.0016 -1.47 -0.0014 -1.01 -0.0013 -0.59 -0.0029 -1.11 
-2 0.0015 1.08 0.0020 1.08 0.0025 0.86 -0.0021 -0.96 
-1 0.0041** 1.99 0.0024 1.54 0.0078 1.36 0.0020 0.82 
0 0.0083*** 4.07 0.0065*** 3.10 0.0086** 2.16 0.0135* 1.86 
1 0.0060** 2.23 0.0045** 2.11 0.0021 0.99 0.0183 1.25 
2 0.0017 1.10 0.0030 1.27 -0.0002 -0.11 0.0010 0.33 
3 0.0019 0.96 0.0001 0.07 0.0036 0.67 0.0043 1.28 
4 0.0030 1.63 0.0046* 1.78 0.0013 0.40 0.0013 0.28 
5 0.0023 1.64 0.0028 1.45 0.0006 0.22 0.0040 1.19 
6 0.0029* 1.81 0.0027 1.48 0.0009 0.28 0.0072 1.55 
7 0.0034 1.62 0.0022 1.18 0.0062 1.12 0.0013 0.48 
8 0.0031* 1.91 0.0056** 2.52 -0.0004 -0.12 0.0019 0.58 
9 0.0033** 2.07 0.0046** 2.21 0.0022 0.67 0.0013 0.40 
10 0.0020 1.20 0.0029* 1.71 0.0030 0.72 -0.0032 -1.55 
Panel B: Cumulative daily abnormal short sales volume within three business days 
 All firms Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled 
Day Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
[ 0, 1 ] 0.0143*** 3.50 0.0110*** 2.95 0.0107* 1.92 0.0318 1.61 
[ 0, 2 ] 0.0159*** 3.20 0.0141*** 2.64 0.0105 1.46 0.0327 1.52 
[ 0, 3 ] 0.0178*** 2.89 0.0142** 2.20 0.0141 1.30 0.0370 1.54 
[ 1, 2 ] 0.0077** 2.12 0.0076* 1.94 0.0019 0.48 0.0192 1.14 




Table 2. 5  
Insider Event, Large Controlling Shareholders, and Abnormal Short Sales 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions for all firms, family-controlled firms, non-controlled firms, and state-controlled 
firms. The dependent variable is daily abnormal short sales.  equals one when the day is day 0, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0 or 
day 1, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0, day 1, or day 2, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market value. 
Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is measured as the bid price minus the ask price, divided by the average of the daily bid 
and ask prices. Book-to-market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity.  represents the cumulative short selling 
volume during the five days prior to day t as a percentage of number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted abnormal returns on day t.  measures the 
cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns during the five days prior to day t. All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered by event. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 All firms Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 0.006***   0.005**   0.004*   0.008   
 (3.461)   (2.401)   (1.708)   (1.246)   
  0.005***   0.004**   0.001   0.013  
  (2.793)   (2.210)   (0.521)   (1.575)  
   0.003**   0.003*   -0.001   0.008 
   (2.140)   (1.864)   (-0.726)   (1.463) 
Firm size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.809) (-0.806) (-0.809) (-3.461) (-3.466) (-3.464) (1.885) (1.887) (1.887) (-0.417) (-0.412) (-0.403) 
Turnover 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (4.963) (4.974) (4.991) (4.401) (4.397) (4.422) (3.040) (3.043) (3.058) (2.917) (2.969) (2.954) 
Bid-ask spread 0.296 0.295 0.294 0.004 -0.001 0.004 0.834 0.830 0.825 -1.203 -1.194 -1.181 
 (0.756) (0.752) (0.748) (0.019) (-0.002) (0.017) (1.154) (1.146) (1.139) (-1.212) (-1.203) (-1.185) 
Book-to-
market 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (-1.407) (-1.405) (-1.412) (-0.918) (-0.914) (-0.922) (-2.456) (-2.460) (-2.462) (-2.410) (-2.419) (-2.427) 
 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.037** 0.037* 0.037* 
 (8.487) (8.489) (8.477) (5.312) (5.313) (5.314) (11.945) (11.929) (11.908) (1.987) (1.973) (1.976) 
 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.015* 0.015* 0.015* 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.037 0.036 0.036 




 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002 0.002* 0.002* 
 (2.173) (2.209) (2.224) (-0.060) (-0.044) (-0.032) (1.816) (1.834) (1.826) (1.649) (1.681) (1.672) 
Intercept -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 0.040 0.040 0.039 -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.193** -0.191** -0.193** 
 (-1.147) (-1.151) (-1.156) (1.552) (1.554) (1.543) (-2.762) (-2.769) (-2.772) (-2.049) (-2.066) (-2.062) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,310 16,310 16,310 8,299 8,299 8,299 5,048 5,048 5,048 2,963 2,963 2,963 






Insider Event, Family Control, and Abnormal Short Sales 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions, across different level of family control, in family-controlled firms. Family 
voting rights refers to the voting rights held by all family members. Family board seats is the number of family members sitting on the board. The dependent variable is daily 
abnormal short sales.  equals one when the day is day 0, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0 or day 1, and zero otherwise.  
equals one when the day is day 0, day 1, or day 2, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market value. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the 
daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is measured as the bid price minus the ask price, divided by the average of the daily bid and ask prices. Book-to-market is the 
quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity.  represents the cumulative short selling volume during the five days prior to day t 
as a percentage of number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted abnormal returns on day t.  measures the cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns 
during the five days prior to day t. All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered by event. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Family voting rights<50% Family voting rights>=50% Family board seats<2 Family board seats>=2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 0.007**   0.001   0.008**   -0.000   
 (2.151)   (0.524)   (2.405)   (-0.162)   
  0.006**   0.000   0.007**   -0.000  
  (2.060)   (0.181)   (2.301)   (-0.263)  
   0.004*   0.000   0.005**   -0.001 
   (1.689)   (0.277)   (2.100)   (-0.489) 
Firm size -
0.009*** 
-0.009*** -0.009*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 (-4.132) (-4.131) (-4.129) (-0.329) (-0.331) (-0.330) (-3.305) (-3.305) (-3.302) (-2.385) (-2.386) (-2.386) 
Turnover 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (4.299) (4.289) (4.319) (3.650) (3.656) (3.654) (3.449) (3.439) (3.461) (4.512) (4.508) (4.513) 
Bid-ask spread -0.377 -0.375 -0.370 0.058 0.057 0.057 -0.087 -0.086 -0.077 0.094 0.095 0.094 
 (-0.935) (-0.933) (-0.922) (0.274) (0.267) (0.269) (-0.204) (-0.200) (-0.181) (0.326) (0.329) (0.329) 
Book-to-
market 
0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.917) (0.919) (0.916) (-4.820) (-4.831) (-4.828) (1.200) (1.204) (1.200) (-4.031) (-4.031) (-4.031) 
 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (5.105) (5.107) (5.109) (3.351) (3.345) (3.349) (5.382) (5.385) (5.389) (0.290) (0.290) (0.291) 




 (1.951) (1.934) (1.941) (3.868) (3.872) (3.876) (1.221) (1.208) (1.218) (4.053) (4.051) (4.051) 
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.411) (-0.386) (-0.371) (2.022) (2.029) (2.026) (-0.004) (0.032) (0.043) (0.509) (0.511) (0.510) 
Intercept 0.103** 0.103** 0.103** -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 0.079** 0.079** 0.078** 0.011 0.011 0.011 
 (2.219) (2.216) (2.206) (-1.262) (-1.262) (-1.264) (2.025) (2.022) (2.010) (0.334) (0.333) (0.335) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,359 5,359 5,359 2,940 2,940 2,940 4,905 4,905 4,905 3,394 3,394 3,394 




Table 2.7  
Insider Event, Family Affiliation, and Abnormal Short Sales 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions, split by 
whether or not the insider is affiliated with the family in the family-controlled firms. The family group 
includes those trades executed by family insiders, and the non-family group refers to those trades 
executed by insiders who do not belong to the family.  equals one when the day is day 0, and 
zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0 or day 1, and zero otherwise.  
equals one when the day is day 0, day 1 or day 2, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of 
the daily market value. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask 
spread is measured as the bid price minus the ask price, divided by the average of the daily bid and ask 
prices. Book-to-market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity. 
 represents the cumulative short selling volume during the five days prior to day t as a 
percentage of number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted abnormal returns on day t. 
 measures the cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns during the five days prior to day t. 
All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered by event. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 Non-family group Family group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 0.006**   0.000   
 (2.402)   (0.073)   
  0.005**   -0.001  
  (2.344)   (-0.572)  
   0.004**   -0.002 
   (2.190)   (-1.099) 
Firm size -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-4.375) (-4.384) (-4.379) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
Turnover 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (4.176) (4.178) (4.196) (3.025) (3.012) (3.027) 
Bid-ask spread 0.144 0.133 0.142 -0.616 -0.617 -0.618 
 (0.504) (0.464) (0.499) (-1.478) (-1.475) (-1.473) 
Book-to-market 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.392) (0.395) (0.388) (-2.447) (-2.449) (-2.458) 
 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 
 (5.136) (5.138) (5.140) (2.002) (1.999) (2.002) 
 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (1.405) (1.396) (1.398) (2.081) (2.079) (2.077) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.334) (0.333) (0.359) (-0.603) (-0.611) (-0.615) 
Intercept 0.071** 0.071** 0.070** -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 
 (2.530) (2.534) (2.516) (-1.074) (-1.077) (-1.081) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,492 6,492 6,492 1,807 1,807 1,807 







Table 2.8  
Abnormal Stock Returns around Insider Sales 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the [-5, -1], [-10, -1], [0, +3], [0, +5], and [0, +10] event windows around insider sales. Abnormal returns are 
measured as size-adjusted returns. Panel A describes CARs around insider sales for all firms, family-controlled firms, non-controlled firms, and state-controlled firms. Panel B 
records CARs around insider sales for different level of family control in family-controlled firms. Family voting rights refers to the voting rights held by all family members. 
Family board seats is the number of family members sitting on the board. Family board presence is the family members sitting on the board as a percentage of the total 
number of board members. Panel C reports CARs around insider sales split by whether or not the insider belongs to the family in the family-controlled firms. The family 
group includes those trades executed in family-controlled firms by family insiders, and non-family group refers to those trades executed by insiders who do not belong to the 
family. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal stock returns and large controlling shareholders 
 All firms  Family-controlled firms Non-controlled firms State-controlled firms 
Day Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
[ -5, -1 ] 0.0161*** 7.96 0.0146*** 5.37 0.0226*** 5.64 0.0101*** 2.90 
[ -10, -1 ] 0.0266*** 8.90 0.0229*** 5.98 0.0368*** 5.92 0.0207*** 3.86 
[ 0, +3 ] 0.0028 1.51 0.0018 0.70 0.0045 1.32 0.0023 0.54 
[ 0, +5 ] 0.0006 0.28 0.0010 0.33 0.0005 0.12 0.0006 0.14 
[ 0, +10 ] -0.0033 -1.12 -0.0056 -1.37 -0.0018 -0.32 0.0019 0.34 
Panel B: Abnormal stock returns and family control 
 Family voting rights 
<50% 
Family voting rights 
>=50% 
Family board seats<2 Family board seats>=2 Family board presence<2 Family board presence>=2 
Day Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
[ -5, -1 ] 0.0119*** 3.66 0.0189*** 3.95 0.0147*** 3.86 0.0145*** 3.96 0.0136*** 3.55 0.0162*** 3.95 
[ -10, -1 ] 0.0185*** 4.12 0.0301*** 4.35 0.0233*** 4.67 0.0224*** 3.75 0.0211*** 4.41 0.0259*** 4.03 
[ 0, +3 ] -0.0022 -0.73 0.0080* 1.84 -0.0014 -0.42 0.0059 1.64 -0.0003 -0.10 0.0050 1.32 
[ 0, +5 ] -0.0054 -1.52 0.0112** 2.04 -0.0049 -1.28 0.0086* 1.74 -0.0033 -0.91 0.0078 1.48 
[ 0, +10 ] -0.0131*** -2.76 0.0062 0.85 -0.0154*** -3.00 0.0072 1.10 -0.0115** -2.32 0.0037 0.53 
Panel C: Abnormal stock returns and insider’s membership (or not) of  family 




Day Mean t-stat Mean t-stat 
[ -5, -1 ] 0.0169*** 5.31 0.0072 1.41 
[ -10, -1 ] 0.0259*** 5.69 0.0137* 1.97 
[ 0, +3 ] 0.0028 1.04 -0.0015 -0.24 
[ 0, +5 ] 0.0002 0.05 0.0037 0.48 




Table 2.9  
Routine Insider Trades, Opportunistic Insider Trades, and Abnormal Short Sales 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around routine and opportunistic insider trades separately. The dependent variable is daily abnormal short 
sales. Panel A displays the regression results across different groups when the main regressor is . Panel B shows the regression results across different groups when 
the main regressor is . Panel C shows the regression results across different groups when the main regressor is . _r refers to routine insider 
trades, and _o refers to opportunistic insider trades. Weak family control group refers to firms with family voting rights less than 50%, and strong family control 
group refers to firms with family voting rights more than 50%. All models include year and industry dummies. The other control variables are all included in the regressions, 
but are not reported in this table. All standard errors are clustered by event. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Regressions across different groups on day 0 
 Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled Weak family control Strong family control  Non-family group Family group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
r -0.002  0.008  0.000  -0.002  -0.002  -0.001  -0.004  
  (-0.703)  (1.394)  (0.057)  (-0.509)  (-0.273)  (-0.261)  (-0.396)  
o  0.006**  0.003  0.008  0.008**  0.001  0.007**  0.001 
  (2.495)  (1.095)  (1.169)  (2.266)  (0.546)  (2.430)  (0.408) 
Panel B: Regressions across different groups in event window [0,1] 
 Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled Weak family control Strong family control  Non-family group Family group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
r 0.005  0.006  0.003  0.007  -0.001  0.011    
  (0.588)  (1.531)  (0.499)  (0.645)  (-0.271)  (0.874)    
o  0.004**  -0.001  0.014  0.006**  0.000  0.005** -0.007 -0.000 
  (2.155)  (-0.270)  (1.546)  (2.005)  (0.201)  (2.178) (-0.775) (-0.023) 
Panel C: Regressions across different groups in event window [0,2] 
 Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled Weak family control Strong family control  Non-family group Family group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
r 0.003  0.005  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.007  -0.007  
  (0.432)  (1.560)  (0.048)  (0.414)  (0.068)  (0.781)  (-0.848)  
o  0.003*  -0.003  0.009  0.004*  0.000  0.004**  -0.001 







 Insiders’ Rank and Abnormal Short Sales 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider sales by insiders’ rank. 
Other senior executives include the chief financial officer, chief operating officer, chief investment officer 
and managers, while the chairman is the chairman of the board. The dependent variable is daily abnormal 
short sales. Panel A displays the regression results across different ranks when the main regressor is 
. Panel B shows the regression results across different ranks when the main regressor is 
. Panel C shows the regression results across different ranks when the main regressor is 
. All models include year and industry dummies. The other control variables are all included 
in the regressions, but are not reported in this table. All standard errors are clustered by event. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***,** and * indicate significance at the 1% ,5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Regressions across different ranks on day 0 
 Chief 
executive 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.009** 0.004 0.008* 
 (0.893) (0.871) (0.161) (2.348) (1.159) (1.656) 
 Panel B: Regressions across different ranks in event window [0, 1] 
 Chief 
executive 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0.011** -0.000 0.006 
 (-0.210) (1.275) (-0.832) (2.426) (-0.123) (1.529) 
Panel C: Regressions across different ranks in event window [0, 2] 
 Chief 
executive 








 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 -0.003 0.003 -0.003* 0.007** 0.002 0.004 






Table 3.1  
Variable Definitions 
This table reports the variable definitions. For the original sample, we select all the Zhong-Zheng 800 
Index (CSI 800) constituent companies listed at the end of 2010 as an initial sample. For the sample firms, 
we construct a manager-firm matched panel dataset, where we track individual CEOs across different 
firms from 2004 through 2010. For each CEO, we hand-collect his/her curriculum vitae from the firm’s 
annual report and the Sina finance website (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/), which summarize CEO 
biographical information in a textual format. Finally, we obtain a sample of 467 firms with 775 individual 
CEOs. 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables   
Institutional ownership Aggregated institutional ownership: number of shares owned by all mutual funds as a percentage of a firm’s tradable shares.  
Long institutional 
ownership 
The aggregated institutional ownership held by long-term investors. See Appendix 1 
for definition of long-term investors. 
Short institutional 
ownership 
The aggregated institutional ownership held by short-term investors. See Appendix 1 
for definition of short-term investors. 
Main regressors   
Business ties   
A dummy variable that equals 1 when the number of connections is above its average 
and 0 otherwise. The number of connections is the number of organizations a CEO 
has worked for throughout his/her career reflected in his/her curriculum vitae, 
excluding government positions. Different organizations in the same business group 
or conglomerate are counted as the same organization. The focal firm where the 
individual serves as CEO and other concurrent positions are included. 
Industry experience 
A dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO’s prior working organizations are in the 
same industry as the focal firm where he/she serves and 0 otherwise. The industry 
classification follows the Shenwan Level I industry criteria. 
Political ties A dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO has any central government, local government, military, or committee working experience and 0 otherwise. 
Turnover A dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm experiences CEO turnover in that year and 0 otherwise.  
Control variables   
ROA Profit before interest and tax scaled by total assets. 
Return The annual stock return. 
Market to book The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
Firm age The firm age. 
Volatility One-year stock volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. 
Firm size The logarithm of total sales. 
Leverage The book value of debt divided by the book value of equity. 
Controller The type of the largest shareholder. 
Independent The number of independent directors as a percentage of the number of all members of the board of directors. 
Large1shper The percentage of the shareholding of the largest shareholder. 
Duality A dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. 





Table 3.2  
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the summary statistics and correlation matrix for the variables. Institutional ownership is denoted as the aggregated institutional ownership, which is number 
of shares owned by all mutual funds as a percentage of a firm’s tradable shares. Long institutional ownership is the aggregated institutional ownership held by long-term 
investors. Short institutional ownership is the aggregated institutional ownership held by short-term investors. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by the profit before interest 
and tax scaled by total assets. Return refers to the annual stock return. Market to book is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Firm age is 
calculated as the current year minus the start year of the firm. Volatility is the one-year stock volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. Firm size is measured by the 
natural logarithm of total sales. Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity. Controller refers to the type of ultimate controller; it is defined as an 
ordinal variable that equals 1 when the controller is enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for individuals, and 0 otherwise. Independent indicates the number 
of independent directors as a percentage of the number of all members of the board of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of the shareholding of the largest 
shareholder. Duality is defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. Education is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 
when a CEO holds as his/her highest degree a bachelor’s degree, 2 for a master’s degree, three for a PhD, and 0 otherwise. Note:  N =2,716. * Correlation coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
  Mean Std. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 Institutional ownership 0.139 0.167                  
2 Long institutional ownership 0.036 0.051 0.811*                 
3 Short institutional ownership 0.033 0.05 0.761* 0.590*                
4 Business ties (number)  2.358 1.651 -0.144* -0.125* -0.118*               
5 Political ties 0.229 0.420 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.126*              
6 Industry experience 0.646 0.478 0.068* 0.054* 0.056* -0.457* -0.320*             
7 Education 2.552 0.778 0.038 0.050* 0.034 0.022 -0.008 -0.039            
8 ROA 0.071 0.695 0.025 0.017 0.019 -0.011 -0.006 -0.016 -0.039           
9 Return 0.704 1.325 0.146* 0.075* 0.079* 0.004 0.004 -0.039 -0.010 0.023          
10 Market to Book 1.74 1.975 0.230* 0.166* 0.218* 0.056* 0.035 -0.047 0.020 0.029 0.375*         
11 Firm age 13.63 3.961 -0.101* -0.047 0.025 0.127* -0.015 -0.076* 0.046 0.025 -0.025 0.078*        
12 Volatility 0.548 0.667 -0.024 -0.001 0.007 0.044 0.018 -0.062* -0.010 -0.006 0.430* 0.168* 0.014       
13 Firm size 22.33 1.206 0.122* 0.109* 0.151* -0.138* -0.020 0.093* 0.093* -0.113* -0.046 -0.329* 0.052* -0.044      







15 Controller 0.943 1.233 -0.043 -0.014 -0.001 0.099* 0.012 -0.151* -0.040 -0.019 0.046 0.061* 0.114* 0.055* -0.116* 0.014    
16 Independent 3.433 0.808 0.028 0.019 0.015 -0.059* -0.017 0.023 0.047 0.008 -0.043 -0.104* -0.017 -0.015 0.334* 0.031 -0.142*   
17 Large1shper 39.720 16.800 0.038 0.014 0.009 -0.071* -0.045 0.119* 0.029 -0.014 -0.033 -0.023 -0.398* -0.031 0.155* 0.024 -0.252* -0.038  





Table 3.3  
CEO Human Capital and Institutional Ownership 
This table reports the fixed-effects panel data regression results of CEO human capital on institutional 
ownership. The dependent variable is the Institutional ownership. It is denoted as the aggregated 
institutional ownership, which is number of shares owned by all mutual funds as a percentage of a firm’s 
tradable shares. Business ties is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the number of connections is above 
its average and 0 otherwise. Industry experience is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO’s prior 
working organizations are in the same industry as the focal firm where he/she serves and 0 otherwise. 
Political ties is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO has any central government, local 
government, military, or committee working experience and 0 otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is 
measured by the profit before interest and tax scaled by total assets. Return refers to the annual stock 
return. Market to book is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Firm 
age is calculated as the current year minus the start year of the firm. Volatility is the one-year stock 
volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of 
total sales. Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity. Controller refers to the 
type of ultimate controller; it is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when the controller is 
enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for individuals, and 0 otherwise. Independent 
indicates the number of independent directors as a percentage of the number of all members of the board 
of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of the shareholding of the largest shareholder. Duality is 
defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. Education 
is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when a CEO holds as his/her highest degree a bachelor’s 
degree, 2 for a master’s degree, three for a PhD, and 0 otherwise. All models include year and firm 
dummies. All standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
                                           Dependent variable: Institutional ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Business ties 0.028***   0.035*** 
 (2.953)   (3.551) 
Industry experience  0.018*  0.031*** 
  (1.838)  (2.769) 
Political ties   0.007 0.012 
   (0.555) (0.964) 
ROA 0.207*** 0.205*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 
 (4.032) (3.974) (4.080) (3.927) 
Return 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (5.663) (5.632) (5.614) (5.748) 
Market to Book 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (1.569) (1.480) (1.544) (1.491) 
Firm age 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.012 
 (0.646) (0.793) (0.776) (0.647) 
Volatility -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.044*** 
 (-2.773) (-2.830) (-2.818) (-2.750) 
Firm size -0.007 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
 (-0.730) (-0.926) (-0.835) (-0.933) 
Leverage 0.007** 0.006** 0.006** 0.007*** 
 (2.453) (2.452) (2.339) (2.757) 
Controller -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 
 (-1.037) (-1.087) (-1.125) (-0.974) 
Independent -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-0.989) (-1.086) (-1.043) (-1.001) 
Large1shper 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.554) (0.432) (0.458) (0.518) 
Duality -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 
 (-0.459) (-0.407) (-0.591) (-0.385) 
Education -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 
 (-0.579) (-0.501) (-0.654) (-0.406) 
Intercept 0.202 0.229 0.224 0.212 





Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,716 2,716 2,716 2,716 






Table 3.4  
Turnover, CEO Human Capital and Institutional Ownership 
This table reports the fixed-effects panel data regression results of CEO turnover and CEO human capital 
on institutional ownership. The dependent variable is the Institutional ownership. It is denoted as the 
aggregated institutional ownership, which is number of shares owned by all mutual funds as a percentage 
of a firm’s tradable shares. Business ties is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the number of 
connections is above its average and 0 otherwise. Industry experience is a dummy variable that equals 1 
when a CEO’s prior working organizations are in the same industry as the focal firm where he/she serves 
and 0 otherwise. Political ties is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO has any central government, 
local government, military, or committee working experience and 0 otherwise. Turnover is a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if a firm experiences CEO turnover in that year and 0 otherwise. Return on assets 
(ROA) is measured by the profit before interest and tax scaled by total assets. Return refers to the annual 
stock return. Market to book is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. 
Firm age is calculated as the current year minus the start year of the firm. Volatility is the one-year stock 
volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of 
total sales. Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity. Controller refers to the 
type of ultimate controller; it is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when the controller is 
enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for individuals, and 0 otherwise. Independent 
indicates the number of independent directors as a percentage of the number of all members of the board 
of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of the shareholding of the largest shareholder. Duality is 
defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. Education 
is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when a CEO holds as his/her highest degree a bachelor’s 
degree, 2 for a master’s degree, three for a PhD, and 0 otherwise. All models include year and firm 
dummies. All standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
                                                     Dependent variable: Institutional ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Business ties  0.035*** 0.041*** 
  (3.549) (3.465) 
Industry experience  0.031*** 0.028** 
  (2.766) (2.100) 
Political ties  0.012 -0.004 
  (0.982) (-0.302) 
Turnover -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.023* 
 (-3.399) (-3.389) (-1.771) 
Turnover*Business ties   -0.013 
   (-1.147) 
Turnover*Industry 
experience 
  0.004 
   (0.313) 
Turnover*Political ties   0.032** 
   (2.464) 
ROA 0.196*** 0.192*** 0.198*** 
 (3.862) (3.733) (3.854) 
Return 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
 (5.492) (5.632) (5.601) 
Market to Book 0.006 0.005 0.005 
 (1.601) (1.555) (1.511) 
Firm age 0.015 0.014 0.017 
 (0.841) (0.716) (0.910) 
Volatility -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 (-2.763) (-2.688) (-2.611) 
Firm size -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
 (-0.783) (-0.902) (-0.812) 
Leverage 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (2.290) (2.742) (2.686) 
Controller -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 





Independent -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (-1.068) (-1.015) (-1.063) 
Large1shper 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.542) (0.597) (0.524) 
Duality -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 
 (-0.719) (-0.594) (-0.631) 
Education -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.417) (-0.197) (-0.168) 
Intercept 0.222 0.213 0.164 
 (0.808) (0.769) (0.591) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,716 2,716 2,716 






Table 3.5  
Investment Horizon, CEO Human Capital and Institutional Ownership 
This table reports the fixed-effects panel data regression results of CEO turnover and CEO human capital on long institutional ownership and short institutional ownership 
respectively. The dependent variable is the Long institutional ownership for Model (1) - (4). It is denoted as the aggregated institutional ownership by long-term institutional 
investors. The dependent variable is the Short institutional ownership for Model (5) - (8). It is denoted as the aggregated institutional ownership by short-term institutional 
investors. Business ties is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the number of connections is above its average and 0 otherwise. Industry experience is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when a CEO’s prior working organizations are in the same industry as the focal firm where he/she serves and 0 otherwise. Political ties is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when a CEO has any central government, local government, military, or committee working experience and 0 otherwise. Turnover is a dummy variable, which equals 
1 if a firm experiences CEO turnover in that year and 0 otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by the profit before interest and tax scaled by total assets. Return refers 
to the annual stock return. Market to book is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Firm age is calculated as the current year minus the 
start year of the firm. Volatility is the one-year stock volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total sales. 
Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of equity. Controller refers to the type of ultimate controller; it is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 
when the controller is enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for individuals, and 0 otherwise. Independent indicates the number of independent directors as a 
percentage of the number of all members of the board of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of the shareholding of the largest shareholder. Duality is defined as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. Education is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when a CEO holds as his/her highest 
degree a bachelor’s degree, 2 for a master’s degree, three for a PhD, and 0 otherwise. All models include year and firm dummies. All standard errors are clustered by firm. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable: Long institutional ownership  Dependent variable: Short institutional ownership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Business ties 0.012***  0.012*** 0.014***  0.003  0.003 0.003 
 (4.083)  (4.069) (3.725)  (0.713)  (0.681) (0.765) 
Industry experience 0.009**  0.009** 0.010**  0.003  0.003 0.002 
 (2.490)  (2.483) (2.417)  (0.691)  (0.684) (0.523) 
Political ties 0.005  0.005 0.004  0.001  0.001 -0.003 
 (1.447)  (1.455) (0.898)  (0.218)  (0.223) (-0.525) 
Turnover  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003   -0.005** -0.005** -0.006 
  (-3.250) (-3.251) (-0.771)   (-2.555) (-2.552) (-1.362) 
Turnover*Business 
ties 
   -0.005     -0.002 
    (-1.175)     (-0.481) 
Turnover*Political ties    0.002     0.007* 
    (0.494)     (1.670) 






    (-0.710)     (0.031) 
ROA 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.042** 0.044***  0.086*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.084*** 
 (2.790) (2.669) (2.572) (2.635)  (4.552) (4.502) (4.433) (4.459) 
Return 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***  0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (3.348) (3.140) (3.250) (3.218)  (1.340) (1.254) (1.270) (1.242) 
Market to Book 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**  0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (2.023) (2.118) (2.081) (2.068)  (5.055) (5.077) (5.077) (5.018) 
Firm age 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008  0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (1.223) (1.387) (1.278) (1.342)  (1.201) (1.340) (1.282) (1.395) 
Volatility -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020***  -0.015** -0.015** -0.015** -0.014** 
 (-3.417) (-3.412) (-3.370) (-3.342)  (-2.471) (-2.457) (-2.441) (-2.368) 
Firm size 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001  0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (0.387) (0.533) (0.427) (0.484)  (2.354) (2.406) (2.373) (2.420) 
Leverage 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (2.505) (2.078) (2.515) (2.410)  (1.328) (1.224) (1.322) (1.278) 
Controller 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.184) (0.168) (0.312) (0.371)  (-0.166) (-0.115) (-0.084) (-0.075) 
Independent 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (0.004) (-0.061) (-0.004) (-0.000)  (-2.172) (-2.208) (-2.183) (-2.195) 
Large1shper 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.431) (0.457) (0.531) (0.535)  (-0.220) (-0.172) (-0.165) (-0.187) 
Duality -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.899) (-1.155) (-1.123) (-1.165)  (-0.710) (-0.911) (-0.872) (-0.882) 
Education -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.865) (-0.833) (-0.646) (-0.594)  (-1.173) (-1.073) (-1.003) (-1.000) 
Intercept -0.121 -0.117 -0.121 -0.129  -0.236** -0.235** -0.236** -0.246*** 
 (-1.469) (-1.411) (-1.461) (-1.559)  (-2.506) (-2.553) (-2.525) (-2.614) 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,716 2,716 2,716 2,716  2,716 2,716 2,716 2,716 





Table 4.1  
Variable Definitions 
This table reports the variable definitions. We use firm-year level data on product differentiation, 
institutional ownership, R&D and advertising between 2000 and 2015. We start with Bloomberg, which 
covers accounting information for all US public firms listed on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX. Finally, 
we obtain 7,106 firm-year observations. 
Variable Definition 
TNIC3TSIMM Total product similarity index (Hoberg and Phillips Library) 
Inst_Own The aggregated institutional ownership: number of shares owned by all institutions as a percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares. 
Inst_Own_Passive The aggregated institutional ownership held by passive institutional investors (banks, insurance companies and pension fund etc.).  
Inst_Own_Active 
The aggregated institutional ownership held by active institutional investors (mutual 
fund, asset management companies, investment banks, brokers, private wealth 
management companies).  
Positive R&D Dummy   A dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero R&D expenses are incurred and 0 otherwise.  
Positive Advertising  
Dummy   
A dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero advertising expenses are incurred and 
0 otherwise. 
Ind_Position A dummy variable that equals 1 when the sales of a firm is above the median sales within the industry (Standard Industry Classification) 
Log Assets The logarithm of total assets. 
Log PPE The logarithm of net plant, property and equipment. 







Table 4.2  
Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
This table presents the summary statistics and correlation matrix for all the variables. TNIC3TSIMM is measured by the total product similarity index from Hoberg and 
Phillips Library. Inst_Own is measured by the aggregate number of shares owned by all institutions as a percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares. Inst_Own_Passive is 
measured by the aggregated institutional ownership held by passive institutional investors (banks, insurance companies and pension fund etc.). Inst_Own_Active is measured 
by the aggregated institutional ownership held by active institutional investors (mutual fund, asset management companies, investment banks, brokers, private wealth 
management companies).  Positive R&D Dummy is denoted as a dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero R&D expenses are incurred and 0 otherwise. Positive 
Advertising Dummy is denoted as a dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero advertising expenses are incurred and 0 otherwise. Ind_Position is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 when the sales of a firm is above the median sales within the industry (Standard Industry Classification). Log Assets is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Log 
PPE is measured by the logarithm of net plant, property and equipment. Log Market Value is measured by the logarithm of market capitalization. 
 
 Variable Mean Std. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 TNIC3TSIMM 3.236 3.927           
2 Inst_Own 0.534 0.301 0.079*          
3 Inst_Own_Active 0.431 0.250 0.095* 0.968*         
4 Inst_Own_Passive 0.102 0.094 0.003 0.705* 0.508*        
5 Positive R&D Dummy   0.741 0.438 0.032* -0.127* -0.133* -0.058*       
6 Positive Advertising  
Dummy   
0.994 0.080 -0.075* 0.082* 0.078* 0.062* -0.023      
7 Ind_Position 0.735 0.442 0.027 0.104* 0.113* 0.041* 0.115* 0.050*     
8 Log Assets 5.860 2.060 0.029 0.377* 0.363* 0.277* -0.043* 0.113* 0.903*    
9 Log PPE 3.869 2.517 -0.058* 0.331* 0.323* 0.229* -0.171* 0.118* 0.114* 0.935*   
10 Log Market Value 6.084 2.230 0.119* 0.672* 0.655* 0.442* -0.003 0.103* 0.193* 0.077* 0.792*  





Table 4.3  
Aggregated Institutional Ownership, R&D, Advertising and Product differentiation 
This table reports the regression results of product similarity index on aggregated institutional ownership, R&D, advertising and the interaction of institutional ownership with 
R&D and advertising respectively. The dependent variable is TNIC3TSIMM, which is is measured by the total product similarity index from Hoberg and Phillips Library. 
Inst_Own is measured by the aggregate number of shares owned by all institutions as a percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares. Positive R&D Dummy is denoted as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero R&D expenses are incurred and 0 otherwise. Positive Advertising Dummy is denoted as a dummy variable that equals 1 when 
non-zero advertising expenses are incurred and 0 otherwise. Ind_Position is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the sales of a firm is above the median sales within the 
industry (Standard Industry Classification). Log Assets is measured by the logarithm of total assets. Log PPE is measured by the logarithm of net plant, property and 
equipment. Log Market Value is measured by the logarithm of market capitalization. All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered at the 
firm level. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inst_Own 1.246*** 0.964*** 0.956*** 12.062*** 12.122*** 12.191*** 
 (4.582) (2.901) (2.863) (3.001) (3.043) (3.107) 
Positive R&D Dummy   -0.600** -0.887*** -1.015*** -0.586* 
   (-2.363) (-2.799) (-3.148) (-1.755) 
Positive Advertising Dummy   -1.570 1.792* 1.870** 0.521 
   (-1.217) (1.877) (1.962) (0.483) 
Inst_Own × Positive R&D  Dummy    0.632 0.601 0.749 
    (1.606) (1.522) (1.574) 
Inst_Own × Positive Advertising  Dummy    -11.642*** -11.680*** -11.862*** 
    (-2.928) (-2.965) (-3.051) 
Ind_Position     -0.502*** -2.357 
     (-3.716) (-1.076) 
Ind_Position × Positive R&D Dummy      -0.729*** 
      (-3.520) 
Ind_Position × Positive Advertising Dummy      2.370 
      (1.085) 
Log Assets  0.628*** 0.629*** 0.600*** 0.571*** 0.580*** 
  (3.648) (3.654) (3.505) (3.314) (3.369) 
Log PPE  -0.891*** -0.896*** -0.881*** -0.865*** -0.856*** 
  (-6.190) (-6.218) (-6.129) (-6.001) (-5.976) 
Log Market Value  0.315*** 0.328*** 0.340*** 0.372*** 0.357*** 





Intercept 1.343*** -0.349 1.732 -1.399 -1.128 -0.090 
 (5.681) (-0.726) (1.259) (-1.265) (-1.025) (-0.079) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 7,194 7,150 7,150 7,150 7,106 7,106 







Active and Passive Institutional Ownership, R&D, Advertising and Product differentiation 
This table reports the regression results of product similarity index on passive institutional ownership, active institutional ownership, R&D, advertising and the interaction of 
each type of institutional ownership with R&D and advertising respectively. The dependent variable is TNIC3TSIMM, which is is measured by the total product similarity 
index from Hoberg and Phillips Library. Inst_Own is measured by the aggregate number of shares owned by all institutions as a percentage of a firm’s outstanding shares. 
Inst_Own_Passive is measured by the aggregated institutional ownership held by passive institutional investors (banks, insurance companies and pension fund etc.). 
Inst_Own_Active is measured by the aggregated institutional ownership held by active institutional investors (mutual fund, asset management companies, investment banks, 
brokers, private wealth management companies).  Positive R&D Dummy is denoted as a dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero R&D expenses are incurred and 0 
otherwise. Positive Advertising Dummy is denoted as a dummy variable that equals 1 when non-zero advertising expenses are incurred and 0 otherwise. Ind_Position is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when the sales of a firm is above the median sales within the industry (Standard Industry Classification). Log Assets is measured by the 
logarithm of total assets. Log PPE is measured by the logarithm of net plant, property and equipment. Log Market Value is measured by the logarithm of market capitalization. 
All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inst_Own_Passive 0.411 0.203 0.192 -0.633 -0.530 -0.389 
 (0.556) (0.283) (0.268) (-0.133) (-0.111) (-0.083) 
Inst_Own_Active 1.448*** 1.153*** 1.146*** 8.887** 8.936** 8.957** 
 (4.319) (2.960) (2.937) (2.198) (2.230) (2.321) 
Positive R&D Dummy   -0.607** -1.036*** -1.167*** -0.722** 
   (-2.393) (-3.226) (-3.583) (-2.166) 
Positive Advertising Dummy   -1.563 0.498 0.573 -0.620 
   (-1.212) (0.509) (0.586) (-0.512) 
Inst_Own_Passive × Positive R&D Dummy    2.035 2.195* 2.074 
    (1.555) (1.700) (1.621) 
Inst_Own_Passive × Positive Advertising Dummy    -0.249 -0.605 -0.745 
    (-0.042) (-0.102) (-0.127) 
Inst_Own_Active × Positive R&D Dummy    0.715 0.630 0.870 
    (1.183) (1.055) (1.433) 
Inst_Own_Active × Positive Advertising Dummy    -8.554** -8.517** -8.699** 
    (-2.009) (-2.020) (-2.139) 
Ind_Position     -0.506*** -2.085 
     (-3.745) (-0.959) 





      (-3.577) 
Ind_Position × Positive Advertising Dummy      2.117 
      (0.975) 
Log Assets  0.624*** 0.624*** 0.592*** 0.563*** 0.573*** 
  (3.625) (3.631) (3.450) (3.254) (3.312) 
Log PPE  -0.890*** -0.895*** -0.881*** -0.864*** -0.856*** 
  (-6.182) (-6.210) (-6.106) (-5.973) (-5.952) 
Log Market Value  0.316*** 0.330*** 0.348*** 0.381*** 0.366*** 
  (4.051) (4.280) (4.496) (4.865) (4.643) 
Intercept 1.327*** -0.351 1.729 -0.012 0.265 1.138 
 (5.702) (-0.728) (1.256) (-0.010) (0.236) (0.903) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs 7,194 7,150 7,150 7,150 7,106 7,106 







Table A1.1  
Insider Event, Large Controlling Shareholders and Abnormal Short Sales based on Estimation window [-60, -11] 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions for all firms, family controlled firms, non-controlled firms and state-controlled 
firms. The dependent variable is daily abnormal short sales (Estimation window [-60, -11] is used).  equals one when the day is day 0, and zero otherwise. 
 equals one when the day is day 0 or day 1, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0, day 1 or day 2, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the 
natural logarithm of the daily market value. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is measured as the bid price minus the ask 
price, divided by the average of the daily bid and ask prices. Book-to-market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity. 
 represents the cumulative short selling volume during the five days prior to day t as a percentage of number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted 
abnormal returns on day t.  measures the cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns during the five days prior to day t. All models include year and industry 
dummies. All standard errors are clustered by event. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 All firms Family-controlled Non-controlled State-controlled 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 0.006***   0.005**   0.004*   0.008   
 (3.451)   (2.404)   (1.678)   (1.264)   
  0.005***   0.004**   0.001   0.014  
  (2.796)   (2.176)   (0.511)   (1.598)  
   0.003**   0.003*   -0.001   0.008 
   (2.141)   (1.800)   (-0.709)   (1.486) 
Firm size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.480) (-1.476) (-1.478) (-4.469) (-4.473) (-4.470) (1.137) (1.139) (1.138) (-0.704) (-0.702) (-0.690) 
Turnover 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (5.836) (5.859) (5.871) (5.132) (5.133) (5.158) (3.417) (3.416) (3.430) (2.917) (2.968) (2.953) 
Bid-ask spread 0.203 0.202 0.201 -0.092 -0.097 -0.092 0.760 0.756 0.751 -1.132 -1.123 -1.110 
 (0.597) (0.593) (0.589) (-0.451) (-0.476) (-0.455) (1.183) (1.172) (1.165) (-1.289) (-1.281) (-1.259) 
Book-to-market -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (-1.291) (-1.289) (-1.297) (-1.063) (-1.058) (-1.068) (-1.473) (-1.479) (-1.482) (-2.298) (-2.309) (-2.316) 





 (9.330) (9.333) (9.316) (6.650) (6.646) (6.647) (14.502) (14.472) (14.429) (2.526) (2.502) (2.510) 
 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.033 0.032 0.032 
 (3.499) (3.498) (3.507) (1.224) (1.219) (1.222) (5.913) (5.906) (5.893) (1.090) (1.086) (1.085) 
 0.000* 0.000** 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (1.952) (1.989) (2.005) (-0.355) (-0.339) (-0.329) (1.887) (1.906) (1.898) (1.620) (1.652) (1.643) 
Intercept -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.063*** -0.070** -0.070** -0.070** -0.175* -0.173* -0.175* 
 (-0.702) (-0.706) (-0.712) (2.827) (2.828) (2.815) (-2.165) (-2.173) (-2.176) (-1.922) (-1.938) (-1.936) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,310 16,310 16,310 8,299 8,299 8,299 5,048 5,048 5,048 2,963 2,963 2,963 






Table A1.2  
Insider Event, Family Control and Abnormal Short Sales based on Estimation window [-60, -11] 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions, across different level of family control, in family-controlled firms (Estimation 
window [-60, -11] is used). Family voting rights refers to the voting rights held by all family members. Family board seats is the number of family members sitting on the 
board. The dependent variable is daily abnormal short sales.  equals one when the day is day 0, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0 or 
day 1, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0, day 1 or day 2, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market value. 
Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is measured as the bid price minus the ask price, divided by the average of the daily bid 
and ask prices. Book-to-market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity.  represents the cumulative short selling 
volume during the five days prior to day t as a percentage of number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted abnormal returns on day t.  measures the 
cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns during the five days prior to day t. All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered by event. 
Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Family voting rights<50% Family voting rights>=50% Family board seats<2 Family board seats>=2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 0.007**   0.001   0.008**   0.000   
 (2.159)   (0.641)   (2.369)   (0.027)   
  0.006**   0.000   0.007**   -0.000  
  (2.041)   (0.294)   (2.222)   (-0.072)  
   0.004*   0.000   0.005**   -0.000 
   (1.646)   (0.350)   (1.990)   (-0.355) 
Firm size -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.188) (-4.187) (-4.184) (-1.839) (-1.841) (-1.841) (-3.635) (-3.635) (-3.631) (-4.108) (-4.110) (-4.110) 
Turnover 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (4.794) (4.793) (4.822) (3.354) (3.360) (3.361) (4.289) (4.288) (4.311) (4.735) (4.729) (4.736) 
Bid-ask spread -0.405 -0.403 -0.399 -0.147 -0.150 -0.149 -0.065 -0.064 -0.056 -0.068 -0.068 -0.067 
 (-1.162) (-1.162) (-1.153) (-0.926) (-0.943) (-0.936) (-0.185) (-0.182) (-0.161) (-0.277) (-0.276) (-0.275) 
Book-to-market 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.780) (0.782) (0.779) (-4.354) (-4.368) (-4.369) (1.145) (1.149) (1.145) (-4.037) (-4.038) (-4.041) 
 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (6.334) (6.332) (6.334) (3.155) (3.151) (3.153) (6.562) (6.557) (6.558) (1.037) (1.037) (1.037) 





 (1.516) (1.498) (1.505) (3.478) (3.483) (3.487) (0.864) (0.850) (0.860) (3.807) (3.807) (3.808) 
 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.637) (-0.611) (-0.598) (1.655) (1.662) (1.660) (-0.163) (-0.127) (-0.118) (0.151) (0.152) (0.153) 
Intercept 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.089** 0.089** 0.089** 0.041 0.041 0.041 
 (2.806) (2.802) (2.789) (-0.282) (-0.283) (-0.285) (2.469) (2.466) (2.452) (1.631) (1.630) (1.631) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,359 5,359 5,359 2,940 2,940 2,940 4,905 4,905 4,905 3,394 3,394 3,394 





Table A1.3  
Insider Event, Family Affiliation and Abnormal Short Sales based on Estimation window [-60, -11] 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions, split by 
whether or not the insider is affiliated with the family, in the family-controlled firms (Estimation window 
[-60, -11] is used). The family group includes those trades executed by family insiders, and the non-
family group refers to those trades executed by insiders that do not belong to the family.  equals 
one when the day is day 0, and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0 or day 1, 
and zero otherwise.  equals one when the day is day 0, day 1 or day 2, and zero otherwise. 
Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market value. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily 
number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is measured as the bid price minus the ask price, divided by the 
average of the daily bid and ask prices. Book-to-market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by 
the daily market value of equity.  represents the cumulative short selling volume during the 
five days prior to day t as a percentage of number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted 
abnormal returns on day t.  measures the cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns during 
the five days prior to day t. All models include year and industry dummies. All standard errors are 
clustered by event. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Non-family group Family group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 0.006**   0.000   
 (2.406)   (0.057)   
  0.005**   -0.001  
  (2.309)   (-0.612)  
   0.004**   -0.002 
   (2.124)   (-1.176) 
Firm size -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-5.399) (-5.408) (-5.400) (-0.543) (-0.544) (-0.545) 
Turnover 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (5.018) (5.025) (5.044) (2.845) (2.838) (2.853) 
Bid-ask spread 0.042 0.031 0.041 -0.506 -0.507 -0.508 
 (0.170) (0.125) (0.164) (-1.275) (-1.272) (-1.272) 
Book-to-market 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.273) (0.275) (0.268) (-2.561) (-2.563) (-2.575) 
 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 
 (6.595) (6.593) (6.595) (2.233) (2.229) (2.230) 
 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
 (1.103) (1.093) (1.095) (2.302) (2.301) (2.300) 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.156) (-0.673) (-0.681) (-0.686) 
Intercept 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.088*** -0.035 -0.035 -0.035 
 (3.677) (3.681) (3.658) (-0.709) (-0.714) (-0.718) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,492 6,492 6,492 1,807 1,807 1,807 






Table A1.4  
Family Control and Abnormal Short Sales 
This table reports OLS regression results for abnormal short sales around insider transactions, across 
different level of family control, in family-controlled firms. Family voting rights refers to the voting 
rights held by all family members.  equals one when the day is day 0, and zero otherwise. 
 equals one when the day is day 0 or day 1, and zero otherwise.  equals one when 
the day is day 0, day 1 or day 2, and zero otherwise. Firm size is the natural logarithm of the daily market 
value. Turnover is the natural logarithm of the daily number of shares traded. Bid-ask spread is measured 
as the bid price minus the ask price, divided by the average of the daily bid and ask prices. Book-to-
market is the quarter-end book value of equity divided by the daily market value of equity.  
represents the cumulative short selling volume during the five days prior to day t as a percentage of 
number of shares outstanding.  is the size-adjusted abnormal returns on day t.  measures 
the cumulative abnormal size-adjusted returns during the five days prior to day t. All models include year 
and industry dummies. All standard errors are clustered by event. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Family voting rights>=60% Family voting rights>=70% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 0.001   0.002   
 (0.524)   (1.004)   
  0.000   0.002  
  (0.181)   (1.383)  
   0.000   0.001 
   (0.277)   (1.131) 
Firm size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.329) (-0.331) (-0.330) (-0.068) (-0.069) (-0.069) 
Turnover 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (3.650) (3.656) (3.654) (4.239) (4.273) (4.273) 
Bid-ask spread 0.058 0.057 0.057 0.217 0.215 0.218 
 (0.274) (0.267) (0.269) (0.999) (0.991) (1.006) 
Book-to-market -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-4.820) (-4.831) (-4.828) (-5.228) (-5.276) (-5.283) 
 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.012 0.012 0.012 
 (3.351) (3.345) (3.349) (0.824) (0.826) (0.825) 
 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (3.868) (3.872) (3.876) (3.729) (3.721) (3.736) 
 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.022) (2.029) (2.026) (4.023) (4.004) (4.002) 
Intercept -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 
 (-1.262) (-1.262) (-1.264) (-1.341) (-1.339) (-1.346) 
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,940 2,940 2,940 1,857 1,857 1,857 








A short-term investor should buy and sell his portfolio frequently, while a long-term 
investor should hold his positions unchanged for a considerable length of time. 
Following Yan and Zhang (2009) and Gaspar et al. (2005, 2012), the churn rate for each 
institutional investor is calculated to measure how frequently he rotates his positions on 
all the stocks of his portfolio over a period. They construct this measure following those 
commonly used to assess an investors’ overall portfolio rotation. If we denote the 
number of companies held by investor  is , the churn rate of investor  at quarter  is  
 
where  and  represent the price and the number of shares, respectively, of 
company  at quarter .  measures the the change percentage of the market value of 
the portfolio held by investor  in quarter .  
Based on the quarterly churn rate, the annual average churn rate of investor  in year , 
, is the average quarterly churn rate over four quarters in a year, which is 
calculated as 
 
Based on the annual average churn rate ( ), each year we sort all institutional 
investors into three tertile portfolios. Those ranked in the top tertile (with the highest 





tertile (with the lowest ) are classified as long-term institutional investors. Given 
the horizon classification, for each firm, we define the aggregated holding by long-term 
institutional investors as long institutional ownership and aggregated holding by short-





















VIF Test for Multicollinearity 
This table reports VIF test results for multicollinearity. The dependent variable is the Institutional 
ownership. It is denoted as the aggregated institutional ownership, which is number of shares owned by 
all mutual funds as a percentage of a firm’s tradable shares. Business ties is a dummy variable that equals 
1 when the number of connections is above its average and 0 otherwise. Industry experience is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 when a CEO’s prior working organizations are in the same industry as the focal 
firm where he/she serves and 0 otherwise. Political ties is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO 
has any central government, local government, military, or committee working experience and 0 
otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by the profit before interest and tax scaled by total assets. 
Return refers to the annual stock return. Market to book is defined as the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of equity. Firm age is calculated as the current year minus the start year of the firm. 
Volatility is the one-year stock volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. Firm size is measured 
by the natural logarithm of total sales. Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of 
equity. Controller refers to the type of ultimate controller; it is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 
when the controller is enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for individuals, and 0 
otherwise. Independent indicates the number of independent directors as a percentage of the number of all 
members of the board of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of the shareholding of the largest 
shareholder. Duality is defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO and chairman are dual and 0 
otherwise. Education is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when a CEO holds as his/her highest 
degree a bachelor’s degree, 2 for a master’s degree, three for a PhD, and 0 otherwise. All models include 
year and firm dummies. All standard errors are clustered by firm. Robust t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Business ties   1.31 0.76 
Industry experience 1.43 0.70 
Political ties 1.14 0.88 
Firm size 1.43 0.70 
Return 1.42 0.71 
Large1shper 1.36 0.73 
Market to book 1.36 0.73 
Firm age 1.28 0.78 
Volatility 1.24 0.80 
Independent 1.18 0.85 
Controller 1.13 0.89 
Duality 1.07 0.93 
ROA 1.02 0.98 
Leverage 1.02 0.98 
Education 1.02 0.98 













CEO Human Capital and Institutional Ownership (GMM) 
This table reports the GMM results of CEO human capital on institutional ownership. The dependent 
variable is the Institutional ownership. It is denoted as the aggregated institutional ownership, which is 
number of shares owned by all mutual funds as a percentage of a firm’s tradable shares. Business ties is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when the number of connections is above its average and 0 otherwise. 
Industry experience is a dummy variable that equals 1 when a CEO’s prior working organizations are in 
the same industry as the focal firm where he/she serves and 0 otherwise. Political ties is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 when a CEO has any central government, local government, military, or committee working 
experience and 0 otherwise. Return on assets (ROA) is measured by the profit before interest and tax 
scaled by total assets. Return refers to the annual stock return. Market to book is defined as the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Firm age is calculated as the current year minus the 
start year of the firm. Volatility is the one-year stock volatility calculated based on the daily closing price. 
Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total sales. Leverage is the book value of debt divided 
by the book value of equity. Controller refers to the type of ultimate controller; it is defined as an ordinal 
variable that equals 1 when the controller is enterprises, 2 when the controller is the government, 3 for 
individuals, and 0 otherwise. Independent indicates the number of independent directors as a percentage 
of the number of all members of the board of directors. Large1per measures the percentage of the 
shareholding of the largest shareholder. Duality is defined as a dummy variable that equals 1 when CEO 
and chairman are dual and 0 otherwise. Education is defined as an ordinal variable that equals 1 when a 
CEO holds as his/her highest degree a bachelor’s degree, 2 for a master’s degree, three for a PhD, and 0 
otherwise. The three main independent variables (Business ties, Political ties and Industry experience) are 
assumed to be endogenous variables. The lag (t-1) of dependent variables and the lag (t-1) and first 
difference of endogenous variables are instrumental variables. All models include year dummies. ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Lag Dependent Variable 0.279* 0.118*** 0.042 
 (1.857) (3.232) (0.737) 
Business ties 0.030** 0.009* 0.002 
 (1.980) (1.724) (0.245) 
Political ties 0.009 0.002 0.006 
 (0.326) (0.267) (0.702) 
Industry experience 0.041* 0.008** 0.002 
 (1.879) (2.040) (0.179) 
ROA -0.184 -0.080 -0.001 
 (-0.665) (-1.245) (-0.017) 
Return -0.004 -0.003 0.005 
 (-0.215) (-0.378) (0.821) 
Market to Book -0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 (-0.072) (0.019) (-0.285) 
Firm age -0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (-0.087) (0.146) (0.508) 
Volatility -0.070 -0.005 -0.046 
 (-0.815) (-0.162) (-1.097) 
Firm size 0.030 0.006 0.011 
 (1.153) (0.886) (1.382) 
Leverage 0.003 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.343) (0.102) (-0.780) 
Controller -0.009 0.001 0.001 
 (-0.549) (0.309) (0.102) 
Independent -0.006 0.005 0.003 
 (-0.266) (0.677) (0.269) 
Large1shper 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.293) (0.736) (0.054) 





 (0.053) (-0.020) (-0.404) 
Education 0.020 0.009 -0.005 
 (0.891) (1.237) (-0.528) 
Intercept -0.556 -0.157 -0.208 
 (-1.078) (-1.234) (-1.281) 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,109 2,109 2,109 
AR(1) 0.002 0.066 0.000 
AR(2) 0.157 0.603 0.606 
Sargan test 0.008 0.070 0.099 
Hansen test 0.714 0.469 0.528 
 
 
 
 
